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In the lead article in this issue, court consultant Roger Hanson examines theimplications of the changing role of the judge.  He rightly notes that judg-ing today is not exactly what it was 30 years ago and asks how changes in
the perceptions of the proper judicial role have affected the behavior of judges.
For most of us, we tend to do our jobs on a daily basis without conscious
thought about the various roles we play (e.g., law applier, mediator, policy
maker), let alone the expectations of others about our performance of each of
those roles.  Although Hanson draws no final conclusions in this article, I think
you will enjoy joining him in giving some structured thought to these issues,
including how they may impact your own
work.  If you see impacts in your own court,
please consider sharing your views through a
letter to the editor for publication in our next
issue.
Perceptions also are the focus of our next
article—this time how the perceptions of family
court judges affect their decisions.  Psychology
professor Leighton Stamps found significant
age-related differences in judges’ attitudes
about whether mothers or fathers should have
custody of children.  In most states, of course,
statutes now prohibit use of the maternal-preference doctrine.  Accordingly,
this article also gives food for thought:  how can we keep alert to our own
biases so that we follow the law and not merely our biases?
Two other articles round out the issue.  Arthur Garrison, a criminal justice
planner with the Delaware Criminal Justice Council, reviews some of the prob-
lems involved in drug-treatment programs, including considerations that
judges must keep in mind.  Garrison’s article is based on detailed research on a
treatment program in Delaware.  Pamela Richardson, a third-year law student
at the Catholic University of America won the American Judges Association’s
2001 writing competition with her article on Illinois v. Wardlow, the Supreme
Court decision upholding the stopping of a pedestrian solely on the basis that
he ran from police in a high-crime area.  Each year, we print the winning entry
in our writing competition, and Richardson’s review of the Wardlow decision is
a well-written review of a very interesting decision.
Last, we invite your attention to the annual index of the past four issues of
Court Review.  All of the articles listed are available on our website at
http://aja.ncsc.dni.us/courtrv/review.html. —SL
Court Review, the quarterly journal of the American
Judges Association, invites the submission of unsolicited,
original articles, essays, and book reviews.  Court Review
seeks to provide practical, useful information to the
working judges of the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
In each issue, we hope to provide information that will be
of use to judges in their everyday work, whether in high-
lighting new procedures or methods of trial, court, or
case management, providing substantive information
regarding an area of law likely to encountered by many
judges, or by providing background information (such as
psychology or other social science research) that can be
used by judges in their work.  Guidelines for the submis-
sion of manuscripts for Court Review are set forth on page
19 of this issue.  Court Review reserves the right to edit,
condense, or reject material submitted for publication.
Court Review is indexed in the Current Law Index, the
Legal Resource Index, and LegalTrac.
Letters to the Editor, intended for publication, are wel-
come.  Please send such letters to Court Review’s editor:
Judge Steve Leben, 100 North Kansas Avenue, Olathe,
Kansas 66061, e-mail address:  sleben@ix.netcom.com.
Comments and suggestions for the publication, not
intended for publication, also are welcome.
Advertising: Court Review accepts advertising for prod-
ucts and services of interest to judges. For information,
contact Deloris Gager at (757) 259-1864.
Photo credit: Mary Watkins. The cover photo is of the
Old State House in Boston, Massachusetts, the oldest sur-
viving public building in Boston, built in 1713. Although
it also housed the Massachusetts Assembly, the building’s
west end was home to the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court and the courts of Suffolk County for many
years. The Declaration of Independence was read aloud to
Bostonians from this balcony in 1776. More about the
history of the building can be found at
http://www.bostonhistory.org/old_state_hs_hist.html.
© 2002, American Judges Association, printed in the
United States.  Court Review is published quarterly by the
American Judges Association (AJA). AJA members
receive a subscription to Court Review. Non-member sub-
scriptions are available for $35 per volume (four issues
per volume).  Subscriptions are terminable at the end of
any volume upon notice given to the publisher.  Prices are
subject to change without notice.  Second-class postage
paid at Williamsburg, Virginia, and additional mailing
offices.  Address all correspondence about subscriptions,
undeliverable copies, and change of address to
Association Services, National Center for State Courts,
P.O. Box 8798, Williamsburg, Virginia 23187-8798.
Points of view or opinions expressed in Court Review are
those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the
positions of the National Center for State Courts or the
American Judges Association.  ISSN: 0011-0647.
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We’ve often heard the remark, “A lawyer who represents
himself has a fool for a client.”  And any judge who has had the
misfortune of presiding over a matter in which an attorney is
self-representing knows all too well the truth of this statement.
It’s not so much that bad lawyers are the ones who make the
(bad) choice to represent themselves, although I have long sus-
pected a correlation.  What I have observed is that even good
lawyers lose their ability to perform well when they become
distracted by their own self-interests.  Lawyers who represent
themselves in court quite often lose that degree of objectivity
and dispassion necessary to make sound legal decisions.  
Zeal and tunnel vision replace the cool detachment that law
school instills.  Just as a doctor should never self-diagnose, a
lawyer, too, should not self-represent.  This point was never
driven home more for me than when, at the end of
a lengthy jury trial of a boring commercial dispute
involving a self-represented attorney, a juror asked
me, “Does he beat his wife?”  Not only had the
attorney done a poor job in representing himself
(he lost), but his over-passionate arguments and
extreme positions left the jurors with the distinct
impression that he was emotionally unstable, per-
haps even dangerous.
If we all know that, generally speaking, even a
law-trained attorney will do a poor job in representing himself
in court, why do we persist in this notion that the justice sys-
tem should do more to assist non-law-trained pro se litigants to
represent themselves in court?
Throughout the country, courts are being encouraged to do
more to assist pro se litigants.  From kiosks to how-to manuals,
from case managers to preprinted pleadings and orders, courts
across our country are bending over backwards, oftentimes at
considerable taxpayer expense, to assist pro se litigants as they
maneuver their way through the legal system.  We continue to
ask ourselves how we can do more to help pro se litigants rep-
resent themselves, yet there is virtually no dialogue on a more
fundamental question—why should we?
The answer most often given is because all citizens have the
absolute right to represent themselves in the court system.
Certainly that is true.  But, except in the context of very sim-
ple, noncomplex legal proceedings, this “right to self-represen-
tation” is euphemistic at best, an oxymoron at worst, because
the “right to self-representation,” in practical effect, is simply
the right to commit legal malpractice.    
In recognition of this basic “right to self-representation,” the
Constitution of the United States could have provided that all
persons accused of crimes have the right to represent them-
selves.  Instead, the Founding Fathers gave us the Sixth
Amendment, which gives every person accused of a crime the
right to have the assistance of counsel.  Even 200 years ago, the
Founding Fathers recognized that as between the concepts of
right to self-representation and right to counsel, the latter is the
one worthy of inclusion in our Bill of Rights.
The second most common answer is because they’re going
to do it anyway.  In other words, the train has left the station,
so we’d better quickly lay some tracks before it derails.  Since
pro se litigants are going to appear in our courts anyway, it is
argued, it is in their best interest and ours alike to make the
process go as smoothly as possible.
But this analysis begs a bigger question.  Do we need to lay
some tracks to prevent derailment?  Or are we actu-
ally encouraging self-represented train travel by lay-
ing the tracks for them to use?  By making the legal
system more easily maneuverable for pro se liti-
gants, are we encouraging more self-representation
than would otherwise occur in the system?  
Who among us would actually encourage an
attorney to represent himself or herself in court?  If
we would not encourage a law-trained individual to
self-represent, then why are we racking our brains
trying to develop new and innovative ways of encouraging
laypersons to undertake self-representation?
Instead of blindly accepting the premise that we need to ease
the burden of self-represented individuals in our justice system,
the court community needs to examine a more fundamental
issue.  We need to decide whether justice is best served by self-
representation or legal representation.   And if we choose the
latter, the justice system needs to concentrate its efforts on pro-
viding legal assistance, not legal malpractice assistance.
Aside from isolated horror stories, including some about bad
lawyers who slept through trials, most judges would agree that
legal representation is the safest and surest route to justice.  If
that’s the case, instead of figuring out how to make it easier to
self-represent, why don’t we spend some time discussing the
more difficult issue of how to make attorneys accessible and
affordable to all persons who seek justice?
A dialogue along those lines would go a long way toward
improving our system of justice—not to mention making our
jobs as judges a little easier.  In my next column, I’ll discuss
some ideas and programs that are being instituted across our
country in the attempt to provide quality and affordable legal
representation to individuals in need. 
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President’s Column
Bonnie Sudderth
Last fall, Congress seriously undermined efforts tostrengthen and improve state court systems.  The appro-priations bill for FY 2002 funded the State Justice Institute
(SJI) at $3 million and called for its demise by September 30,
2003.  
SJI is the only federal institution dedicated to improving the
state court systems.  It does this primarily by funding national-
scope court projects and the awarding of educational scholar-
ships to court personnel.  A national effort led by the
Conference of Chief Justices (CCJ) and the Conference of State
Court Administrators (COSCA) is under way in the court com-
munity to reverse this decision and gain full funding for FY
2003.
While SJI has faced difficulties in funding before, this was
the first time that its elimination has been legislated.  The $3
million for SJI is just enough to cover the costs of phasing out
the institution as of September 30.  
BACKGROUND
SJI was established by federal law in 1984 and it is, in fact,
the only vehicle for distributing federal funds dedicated exclu-
sively to improving the quality of the nation’s state courts.
Since becoming operational in 1987, SJI has supported more
than 1,000 projects with awards totaling more than $125 mil-
lion.  Courts in every state have received at least one SJI grant.
Other grantees receiving awards include national court-support
organizations, such as the National Center for State Courts;
national court-education organizations, including the National
Judicial College and American Academy of Judicial Education;
national and state court membership organizations, such as the
American Judges Association and the National Association for
Court Management; universities; bar associations; other non-
profit groups; and individuals receiving judicial scholarships.
Annual funding for SJI—which was last authorized by
Congress to receive an annual appropriation of $25 million,
modest by federal standards—has ranged from $13.55 million
in the mid-1990s to $6.85 million in 2001.
SJI is not a federal agency but rather a nonprofit corporation
governed by a board of directors whose members are appointed
by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate.  By law, the
board must include six state court judges, a state court admin-
istrator, and four public members.  The judicial and state court
administrator members must be selected from a list submitted
to the President by the Conference of Chief Justices.
WIDESPREAD SUPPORT
The proposed elimination of SJI has not been popular with
the state court community.  Besides CCJ and COSCA, other
groups have also gone on record as opposing the elimination of
SJI.  They include the American Judges Association, the
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Conference of Court Public Information Officers, the
Leadership Institute in Judicial Education, the National
Association of State Judicial Educators, the National College of
Probate Judges, the Association of Trial Lawyers, the Civil
Justice Reform Group, the National Association for Court
Management, the National Association of Women Judges, the
National Conference of Appellate Court Clerks, and the
American Bar Association.
Already, meetings have occurred with important members of
the House and Senate Appropriations Committee on maintain-
ing SJI.  In March, South Carolina Chief Justice Jean Toal and
Robert Miller (retired chief justice of South Dakota and chair-
man of SJI’s board) met with Senate Appropriations–
Commerce, Justice, State Subcommittee Chairman Ernest
Hollings (D-S.C.) and made the case for keeping SJI.  The
Commerce, Justice, State Subcommittee is the Congress’s pri-
mary funding body for SJI.  This was followed by an April meet-
ing between Chief Justice Harry Carrico of Virginia and House
Appropriations–Commerce, Justice, State Subcommittee
Chairman Frank Wolf (R-Va.).  Other members of the full
House and Senate Appropriations Committees also have been
the primary targets of the “Save SJI” message.  In addition to
meeting with state court representatives, these members have
been receiving faxes, letters, e-mails, and phone calls from the
state court community.
In our constant communications with members of Congress
and their staff, no one has contended that SJI has been doing a
poor job or wasting taxpayer dollars.  In fact, most objections
center on the need for fiscal tightening throughout the federal
government.  SJI, perhaps due to its small size, seems to be a
target for elimination.
As stated in the CCJ/COSCA resolution supporting SJI, the
$13.5 million amount requested for FY 2003 is “a necessary
first step” for this organization.  The state court community
intends to fight for that amount and gradually call for addi-
tional funds in the following years to the amount originally
authorized by Congress.  Only then can SJI truly fulfill its
national mission and scope.
PROJECTS FUNDED
SJI has primarily addressed pressing national issues through
its grants process.  For example, SJI provided early seed money
for improving the way state courts across the country deal with
family violence cases, which began to fill court dockets.  To
address this growing problem, SJI convened the first-ever
National Conference on Family Violence and the Courts.  All
50 states sent teams of judges, criminal justice officials, social
service/domestic violence workers, and others to develop
strategies to respond to family violence.  After the conference,
SJI awarded grants to help 17 states put those plans into action.
The result:  in those 17 states, there was an unprecedented
Saving the State Justice Institute
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degree of collaboration between agencies and organizations
that usually know of each other, but rarely communicate with
each other.  All this benefited abused women and children in
those states.  Even more, the results of that teamwork are avail-
able to anyone who requests them from SJI or goes to the SJI
website:  www.statejustice.org.
One of the benefits of allocating funding through SJI is it only
has the authority to work with all aspects of state court systems.
Since family violence cases come to the state courts in criminal,
civil, juvenile, and family courts, SJI is able to respond in a com-
prehensive matter.  On the other hand, any federal agency
attempting to respond would have to do it in a piecemeal fash-
ion; for example, the Department of Health and Human Services
could only fund projects related to child support cases.
SJI has also been helpful in helping address problems due to
illegal drugs.  As it did with family violence, SJI coordinated a
national conference followed by a round of grants implement-
ing many state plans.  It has also supported the first national
evaluation of drug courts.  SJI also hosted regular meetings of
federal funding agencies concerned with the criminal use of
drugs such as the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the National
Institute of Justice, the Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, and the Center for Substance Abuse
Prevention and Treatment.  The goal of these meetings was to
coordinate efforts, avoid duplication, and maximize the impact
of federal dollars.
Other projects funded by SJI that have had a national impact
include examining the utility of court-based computer infor-
mation kiosks and the delivery of conferences via CD-ROM.  
KPMG REPORT
On March 31, 2002, the consulting firm of KPMG con-
ducted a survey of SJI projects relating to drug abuse, family
violence, and violence against women.  The survey was
designed to identify respondents’ awareness of SJI projects and
resources, the involvement of the respondents in SJI-supported
actions, actions taken by respondents as a result of the involve-
ment, and the benefit gained from such actions.
“It is clear from the results of the survey that SJI’s impact has
been felt in state court systems across the country,” the KPMG
report concluded.  “This impact is not limited to the specific
grant recipients, but instead the many grants that have had an
impact on other court systems nationwide.” 
CONCLUSION
It is undeniable that SJI serves critical national and federal
purposes.  At a time when the public demands for an efficient
and accountable use of taxpayer funds from every level of gov-
ernment, it is counterproductive for Congress to dismantle the
only federally funded organization dedicated to helping the state
courts more efficiently cope with their increased workload.  In
addition, what happens in state courts affects not only citizens’
concepts of justice and confidence in the judicial system, but
also the operation of federal courts.  Congress must keep alive
the only institution charged with improving the system where
most Americans experience justice—our state courts.
ACTION REQUESTED
We urge you to contact your
U.S. senator or representative
and make the case for keeping
SJI, especially if they serve on
the Appropriations Committee.
We still have a number of mem-
bers on the Appropriations
Committee who have not been
contacted.  A list of the
Appropriations Committee members, along with their fax
numbers and e-mail addresses , accompanies this essay.  Faxes
and e-mails are more effective at this time due to increased
scrutiny being given to the U.S. mail.  
In addition, we must continue to highlight that a funding
level of $13.55 million is needed for SJI to be truly effective in
fulfilling its national mission.  Finally, the “repetition effect”
cannot be overemphasized.  The busy lives of members of
Congress necessitates this kind of strategy.  If you have already
communicated with your member, be sure to extend your
thanks along with your hopes for a positive result for SJI.
For the full copy of the KPMG report, as well as a summary
of the grants that have gone to your state, go to the SJI website
at www.statejustice.org.  Please keep the NCSC Government
Relations Office informed of your outreach to congressional
members as we are keeping a log of such efforts.  Please let me
know of your efforts, and feel free to call me with any questions
or concerns.
José Dimas is a government relations associate
at the National Center for State Courts.  He has
extensive experience in federal relations, having
worked both on Capitol Hill and elsewhere in
the federal government. Dimas has a bachelor's
degree in government from the University of
Texas at Austin and a master’s degree in public
policy from Baylor University.
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We urge you 
to contact your
U.S. senator or
representative
and make the
case for 
keeping SJI.
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary
CONTACTING MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Funding for the State Justice Institute is under the jurisdiction of the Appropriations Committee of each house of Congress.
Initial decisions are made by the Subcommittees on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary.
DETAILED CONTACT INFORMATION
(Members of the Subcommittees on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary appear in Bold)
REPUBLICANS 
Frank R. Wolf, Va. - chairman
Harold Rogers, Ky.
Jim Kolbe, Ariz.
Charles H. Taylor, N.C.
Ralph Regula, Ohio
Tom Latham, Iowa
Dan Miller, Fla.
David Vitter, La.
DEMOCRATS 
Jose E. Serrano, N.Y. - ranking member
Alan B. Mollohan, W.Va.
Lucille Roybal-Allard, Calif.
Robert E. “Bud” Cramer, Ala.
Patrick J. Kennedy, R.I.
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary
DEMOCRATS 
Ernest F. Hollings, S.C. - chairman
Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii
Barbara A. Mikulski, Md.
Patrick J. Leahy, Vt.
Herb Kohl, Wis.
Patty Murray, Wash.
Jack Reed, R.I.
REPUBLICANS 
Judd Gregg, N.H. - ranking member
Ted Stevens, Alaska
Pete V. Domenici, N.M.
Mitch McConnell, Ky.
Kay Bailey Hutchison, Tex.
Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Col
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HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
Member Fax # E-mail 
Republicans (36) 
C.W. Bill Young, Fla. – chairman 202-225-9764 bill.young@mail.house.gov 
Ralph Regula, Ohio 202-225-3059 http://wwwa.house.gov/regula/zipauth.htm 
Jerry Lewis, Calif. 202-225-6498 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
Harold Rogers, Ky. 202-225-0940 talk2hal@mail.house.gov  
Joe Skeen, N.M. 202-225-9599 joe.skeen@mail.house.gov  
Frank R. Wolf, Va. 202-225-0437 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
Tom DeLay, Tex. 202-225-5241 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
Jim Kolbe, Ariz. 202-225-0378 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
Sonny Callahan, Ala. 202-225-0562    
James T. Walsh, N.Y. 202-225-4042 rep.james.walsh@mail.house.gov  
Charles H. Taylor, N.C. rep.charles.taylor@mail.house.gov  
David L. Hobson, Ohio 202-225-1984 http://www.house.gov/hobson/formmail.htm  
Ernest Istook, Okla. 202-226-1463 istook@mail.house.gov  
Henry Bonilla, Texas 202-225-2237 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
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Member Fax # E-mail 
Joe Knollenberg, Mich. 202-226-2356 rep.knollenberg@mail.house.gov  
Dan Miller, Fla. 202-226-0828 http://www.house.gov/danmiller/survey/survey.html  
Jack Kingston, Ga. 202-226-2269 jack.kingston@mail.house.gov  
Rodney Frelinghuysen, N.J. 202-225-3186 rodney.frelinghuysen@mail.house.gov  
Roger Wicker, Miss. 202-225-3549 roger.wicker@mail.house.gov  
George Nethercutt, Wash. 202-225-3392 george.nethercutt-pub@mail.house.gov  
Randy “Duke” Cunningham, Calif. 202-225-2558 http://www.house.gov/cunningham/IMA/get_address3.htm  
Todd Tiahrt, Kan. 202-225-3489 tiahrt@mail.house.gov  
Zach Wamp, Tenn. 202-225-3494 http://www.house.gov/wamp/IMA/get_address4.htm  
Tom Latham, Iowa 202-225-3301 latham.ia05@mail.house.gov  
Anne M. Northup, Ky. 202-225-5776 rep.northup@mail.house.gov  
Robert B. Aderholt, Ala. 202-225-5587 robert.aderholt@mail.house.gov  
Jo Ann Emerson, Mo. 202-226-0326 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
John E. Sununu, N.H. 202-225-5822 rep.sununu@mail.house.gov  
Kay Granger, Tex. 202-225-5683 texas.granger@mail.house.gov  
John E. Peterson, Pa. 202-225-5796 john.peterson@mail.house.gov  
Virgil H. Goode, Jr., Va. (I) 202-225-5681 rep.goode@mail.house.gov  
John T. Doolittle, Calif. 202-225-5444 doolittle@mail.house.gov  
Ray LaHood, Ill. 202-225-9249 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
John E. Sweeney, N.Y. 202-225-6234 john.sweeney@mail.house.gov  
David Vitter, La. 202-225-0739 david.vitter@mail.house.gov  
Donald L. Sherwood, Pa. 202-225-9594 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
Democrats (29)
David R. Obey, Wis. - ranking member 202-225-3240 http://www.house.gov/writerep/ 
John P. Murtha, Pa. 202-225-5709 murtha@mail.house.gov  
Norm Dicks, Wash. 202-226-1176 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
Martin Olav Sabo, Minn. 202-225-4886 martin.sabo@mail.house.gov  
Steny H. Hoyer, Md. 202-225-4300 http://www.house.gov/hoyer/letstalk.htm  
Alan B. Mollohan, W.Va. 202-225-7564   
Marcy Kaptur, Ohio 202-225-7711 rep.kaptur@mail.house.gov  
Nancy Pelosi, Calif. 202-225-8259 sf.nancy@mail.house.gov  
Peter J. Visclosky, Ind. 202-225-2493 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
Nita M. Lowey, N.Y. 202-225-0546 nita.lowey@mail.house.gov  
Jose E. Serrano, N.Y. 202-225-6001 jserrano@mail.house.gov  
Rosa DeLauro, Conn. 202-225-4890 http://www.house.gov/delauro/message.html  
James P. Moran, Va. 202-225-0017 http://www.house.gov/moran/letstalk.htm  
John W. Olver, Mass. 202-226-1224 http://www.house.gov/olver/emailme.html  
Ed Pastor, Ariz. 202-225-1655 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
Carrie P. Meek, Fla. 202-226-0777 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
David E. Price, N.C. 202-225-2014 david.price@mail.house.gov  
Chet Edwards, Tex. 202-225-0350 http://www.house.gov/edwards/IMA/get_address2.htm  
Robert E. “Bud” Cramer, Ala. 202-225-4392 budmail@mail.house.gov  
Patrick J. Kennedy, R.I. 202-225-3290 patrick.kennedy@mail.house.gov  
James E. Clyburn, S.C. 202-225-2313 jclyburn@mail.house.gov  
Maurice D. Hinchey, N.Y. 202-226-0774 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
Lucille Roybal-Allard, Calif. 202-226-0350 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
Sam Farr, Calif. 202-225-6791 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
Jesse L. Jackson Jr., Ill. 202-225-0899 webmaster@jessejacksonjr.org  
Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick, Mich. 202-225-5730 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
Allen Boyd, Fla. 202-225-5615 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
Chaka Fattah, Pa. 202-225-5392 http://www.house.gov/writerep/  
Steven R. Rothman, N.J. 202-225-5851 steven.rothman@mail.house.gov  
COMMUNICATING WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Personal Visits: If possible, schedule personal visits with your Members of Congress either in Washington, D.C. or in their
home offices as soon as possible. If you cannot schedule a visit for several weeks, precede it with a letter. It is critical that you
convey your concerns in the next few weeks.
Phone contact: The office of any Member of Congress may be reached through the Capitol Switchboard: 202-224-3121.
Letters: A letter succinctly expressing your concerns and the action you are asking the member to take should be sent, even if
you plan to visit in person.  A post-visit thank-you letter also is recommended because it is appreciated and gives you an oppor-
tunity to reiterate your message.
Mail delivery to Congress has been slow since the anthrax scare.  If possible, fax your letters.  Transmission by e-mail attach-
ment is not as effective, because such letters do not always get printed out. In addition, please note that many offices block e-
mail that is not from constituents.
Addressing Correspondence:
To a Representative To a Senator
The Honorable (full name) The Honorable (full name)
United States House of Representatives United States Senate
Washington, DC 20515 Washington, DC 20510
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SENATE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
Senator Fax # E-mail 
Democrats (15)  
Robert C. Byrd, W.Va. – chairman 202-228-0002 senator_byrd@byrd.senate.gov 
Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii 202-224-6747 senate@inouye.senate.gov  
Ernest F. Hollings, S.C. 202-224-4293 http://hollings.senate.gov/webform.html  
Patrick J. Leahy, Vt. 202-224-3479 senator_leahy@leahy.senate.gov  
Tom Harkin, Iowa 202-224-9369 tom_harkin@harkin.senate.gov  
Barbara A. Mikulski, Md. 202-224-8858 http://mikulski.senate.gov/mailform.htm  
Harry Reid, Nev. 202-224-7327 Senator_reid@reid.senate.gov  
Herb Kohl, Wis. 202-224-9787 Senator_kohl@kohl.senate.gov  
Patty Murray, Wash. 202-224-0238 Senator_murray@murray.senate.gov  
Byron L. Dorgan, N.D. 202-224-1193 Senator@dorgan.senate.gov  
Dianne Feinstein, Calif. 202-228-3954 http://feinstein.senate.gov/email.html  
Richard J. Durbin, Ill. 202-228-0400 Dick@durbin.senate.gov  
Tim Johnson, S.D. 202-228-5765 Tim@johnson.senate.gov  
Mary L. Landrieu, La. 202-224-9735 http://landrieu.senate.gov/newsite/webform.html  
Jack Reed, R.I. 202-224-4680 Jack@reed.senate.gov  
Republicans (14)  
Ted Stevens, Alaska – ranking member 202-224-2354 http://stevens.senate.gov/webform.htm 
Thad Cochran, Miss. 202-224-9450 Senator@cochran.senate.gov  
Arlen Specter, Pa. 202-228-1229 http://www.senate.gov/~specter/webform.htm  
Pete V. Domenici, N.M. 202-228-0900 http://domenici.senate.gov/contact/contactme.cfm  
Christopher S. Bond, Mo. 202-224-8149 kit_bond@bond.senate.gov  
Mitch McConnell, Ky. 202-224-2499 Senator@mcconnell.senate.gov  
Conrad Burns, Mont. 202-224-8594 http://www.senate.gov/~burns/mailform.htm  
Richard C. Shelby, Ala. 202-224-3416 Senator@shelby.senate.gov  
Judd Gregg, N.H. 202-224-4952 Mailbox@gregg.senate.gov  
Robert F. Bennett, Utah 202-228-1168 Senator@bennett.senate.gov  
Ben Nighthorse Campbell, Colo. 202-224-1933 http://campbell.senate.gov/email.htm  
Larry E. Craig, Idaho 202-228-1067 http://www.senate.gov/~craig/frontpage.htm  
Kay Bailey Hutchison, Texas 202-224-0776 Senator@hutchison.senate.gov 
Mike DeWine, Ohio 202-224-6519 Senator_dewine@dewine.senate.gov  
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1. See Greg Berman, What Is a Traditional Judge Anyway?
Problem-Solving in the State Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 78 (2000);
John Feinblatt & Dereck Denckla, Prosecutors, Defenders and
Problem-Solving Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 206 (2001).
There is a lot of talk these days about the role of a judge,especially among trial court judges. Frequently the dis-cussion is framed in terms of whether the judiciary
should be expected to behave in one of two polar-opposite
ways. Should they be primarily almost aloof finders of fact,
impartial and nearly devoid of intimate contact with and
knowledge of litigants and their circumstances? Or should
they be one of many possible partners to a diagnostic, thera-
peutic oriented response process to ameliorate underlying and
messy problems of litigants? These choices confront judges
with the creation and development of drug courts, domestic
abuse courts, gun courts, mental health courts, community
courts, and other courts revolving around social maladies.
These are not negligible choices with few consequences.
The contention of this article is that changes in judicial roles
have profound implications, even though the advocates of par-
ticular role changes might see them as improvements in the
manner in which judges make decisions and carry out their
responsibilities. To support this argument, the article tries to
sort out some of the implications of what has happened to the
judicial role in past several years. Certainly there are few
judges who would claim that judging today is just like it was
30 years ago, or like they think it was 30 years ago. For this
reason, I think that there is a need for a deliberative and pur-
posive discussion on the judicial role—past, present, and
future. The intended contribution of this article is to encour-
age that dialogue by synthesizing scholarly observations on the
importance of the judicial role, to suggest what have been
implications of past role changes, and to recommend what
should be on the future agenda of action and research.
I.  INTRODUCTION
The notion that individuals play particular roles in society
is a persuasive and pervasive proposition in the study of
human behavior.  Role orientations are defined as an individ-
ual’s expectations on what he or she should do. And role behav-
ior is defined as what an individual actually does in terms of
identifying problems, searching for alternative responses to
those problems, weighing the pros and cons of the alternatives
to the current condition, selecting the most promising
response, and then implementing that response. Cast in that
light, it is understandable that the notion of roles has been
applied to the study of decision makers. In fact, one of the first
applications of this concept was to legislators, at both the
national and the state levels.
Studies of judges have incorporated the notion of judicial
roles to describe and to explain judicial decision-making
behavior.  Court reformers have embraced into their vocabu-
lary the notion of roles and urged that judges adopt new ones
to fit emerging needs and circumstances.  Both scholarly
researchers and visionaries of court improvement have
accepted the fundamental premise that if judicial expectations
or role orientations are changed, a judge’s role behavior will be
altered in meaningful and substantial ways. And those ways
might, in turn, affect a litigant’s behavior in a socially desirable
manner.
The most recent chapter in the unfolding story of judicial
roles is the current discussion surrounding problem-solving
courts and problem-solving judges.1 As we will see below,
however, the analysis of roles has a history. This history allows
us to talk about the implications of role changes more deeply
than if the discussion just began with the contemporary issue
of problem-solving courts. Hence, it is both possible and
worthwhile to try to sort out the implications of past changes
in judicial role orientations and judicial role behavior to
enlighten the current condition. 
The basic objective of this article, then, is to explore
whether there are some common patterns to what happens
with the introduction of new and different judicial expecta-
tions.  To assess whether there are discernable patterns, I
believe that it is fruitful to engage in a dual exercise of reflect-
ing on what the scholarly literature on the subject of judicial
roles has contributed and by considering essential aspects of
court reforms that have occurred during the past 35 years. 
Bringing past reforms into the discussion is useful in two
ways. First, it provides well-known examples of how judges
have changed their behavior and court policies. These illustra-
tions establish the practical significance of thinking about the
judicial expectations that underlie these important phenom-
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ena. Second, reforms are a useful epistemological platform on
which to sort out the implications of changing judicial expec-
tations without first having to define the proper expectations
and the proper behavior of a judge. Universal agreement has
not been achieved in either area, but that situation need not
inhibit the discussion of the implications of changes in judicial
expectations.  Implications of changing expectations can be
seen, at least indirectly, from major court reforms.
The benefits of discussing the implications of changing
judicial expectations are threefold: First, it is essential to know
the whether the conscious decision by judges to change their
expectations has recognizable implications. Persistent and
consistent implications of changing judicial expectations per-
mit the opportunity for reflection and deliberation by judges
on whether to continue modifying their expectations or role
orientations.  Second, an understanding of the path that impli-
cations generally take will enable us to monitor role changes in
progress.  It is helpful to be able to know where role changes
are headed to anticipate their eventual consequences.  Third,
knowledge of the pattern of implications wrought by changes
in judicial expectations is vital because an all too common
reaction to changes in judicial role behavior and correspond-
ing policies is near hysteria.  Because the American legal sys-
tem is oriented favorably to maintaining both substantive and
procedural precedents, change itself is greeted with skepticism
by some observers. Before dismissing changes in judicial role
behavior out of hand as inappropriate, the implications should
first be understood as carefully as possible. 
II. LEADING OBSERVATIONS AND POSSIBLE LESSONS
FROM THE LITERATURE
Previous research has documented several important char-
acteristics of judicial roles that serve as a useful analytical
framework. The literature tries to clarify the general nature
and significance of judicial roles. In contrast, visionaries and
practitioners of court reform frequently assert the benefits to
be derived from particular role changes and focus primarily on
how to put corresponding court reforms into place. Hence, the
scholarly literature provides a needed perspective on judicial
roles.
Basically, I believe that there are five leading propositions
extant in the literature, although readers might find it enlight-
ening to examine referenced sources for more specific details
of substance and methodology. Because the literature concerns
both trial and appellate courts, some of the propositions might
seem to be drawn from settings that are not relevant to the con-
temporary discussion ongoing in many trial courts. Yet, dis-
cussion of what is the most proper role of an appellate court
judge parallels aspects of the trial court discussions. Hence, I
think that they have relevance and I have tried to state them in
the most relevant manner possible. The five propositions are as
follows:
First, there is no single judicial role based on one distinct
set of expectations or role ori-
entation.  There are multiple
role orientations that any
given judge can adopt.  This
now seemingly obvious state-
ment is startling when set
along the history of debate
over the proper role of a
judge.
As everyone knows, there
has been a long-standing
debate in the legal academy
and among the participants
engaged in the selection of
judges, especially federal
judges.  Some participants
contend that a judge’s role behavior is to interpret the plain
meaning of the law and apply it strictly to the facts in an
instant case. Other observers contend that a judge’s role behav-
ior is to adapt the law to changing circumstances and tech-
nologies and to consider socially desired consequences in
resolving specific disputes.  As fascinating, intriguing, and
compelling as the give and take among the participants to this
debate may be, the discussions seem somewhat abstract and
elevated in light of what judges have claimed are their jobs.
Moreover, the less abstract judicial role orientations are seen in
studies of both appellate judge and trial judges.
One of the initial efforts to study judicial roles raised the
prospect that there are at least five distinct sets of judicial
expectations or role orientations.2 The following five names
are given to role orientations believed to be held by justices of
supreme courts in Louisiana, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and
Pennsylvania:
• The Task Performer—emphasizes processing litigation and
maintaining smooth court operations.
• The Adjudicator—emphasizes deciding cases.
• The Law Maker—emphasizes interpreting the law to fit
changing circumstances and technologies.
• The Administrator—emphasizes the supervision of the bar
and the lower courts.
• The Constitutional Defender—emphasizes strict adher-
ence to the Constitution and the avoidance of basing deci-
sions on socially desired outcomes.  (This role presumably
is a counter to the Law Maker.)
Of course, these categories reflect the context and setting in
which the study was conducted—four state supreme courts in
approximately 1970.  Perhaps, more importantly, the construc-
tion and classification of judicial expectations is based on a
2. HENRY ROBERT GLICK, SUPREME COURTS IN STATE POLITICS: AN
INVESTIGATION OF THE JUDICIAL ROLE 30-34 (1971).
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classification of responses by
individual justices to a single,
open-ended question.  That ques-
tion was, “How would you
describe the job of a supreme
court judge?”  Nevertheless, the
multiple categories illustrate the
elemental proposition that the
role orientation of a judge is not
a single task or responsibility that
might be carried out in different
ways.  On the contrary, judges have distinctively different sets
of expectations on what they should do.
This same research made a related observation concerning
the dominance of particular role orientations.  Justices from dif-
ferent states tend to emphasize one role over another, although
justices cluster together more with justices from some states
than from others.  These differences are attributed to differences
in tradition and position of the courts in their respective state
governmental systems. For example, more of New Jersey
Supreme Court justices emphasized the expectations associated
with the Law Maker’s role orientation than did the justices in
the other states. The views of the New Jersey justices were
interpreted as a result of the successful efforts of  former New
Jersey Chief Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt to gain acceptance of
the New Jersey Supreme Court’s role in legal policy making by
the other branches of government in New Jersey.3
A second theme in the literature is the proposition that
expectations do in fact affect a judge’s behavior.  This proposi-
tion is one of the overarching premises on which the study of
judicial roles is based.  Because of the time and cost of just
mapping a judge’s expectations, most scholarly investigations
of judicial roles have foregone the business of linking mea-
sured role orientations to independently measured role behav-
ior.  Fortunately, some scholars have made the linkage.  Two
studies are worth mentioning.
One study piggybacked an inquiry on roles and trial court
timeliness onto a previous investigation.  The previous investi-
gation had conducted a study of trial court judges in Ohio and
produced five categories of role orientations.4 The categories
were constructed through a quantitative analysis of responses
to multiple, closed-ended questions about their agreement or
disagreement that particular factors influence their decision
making.5 The names of the role orientations were as follows:
• The Law Interpreter—emphasizes adherence to judicial
restraint.
• The Adjudicator—emphasizes concern for social conse-
quences of decisions.
• The Administrator—emphasizes procedural goals and
precedent only if they expedite case resolution.
• The Trial Judge—emphasizes a concern for timeliness, jus-
tice in individual cases, and precedent.
• The PeaceKeeper—emphasizes a balancing of contending
principles and does not consider stare decisis to be the
working rule of law.
The questions that made up the role orientation of the judge
as an administrator were then asked of judges by another
researcher in a subsequent study of trial court judges in three
anonymous metropolitan courts in 1978.6 Each judge was
classified to the extent he or she emphasizes the role orienta-
tion of the administrator.  The research question then became,
“Do the judges that adhere to the administrator’s role more
closely than other judges resolve their cases more expedi-
tiously?”
The answer was yes.  Moreover, not only was timeliness
related to the administrator’s role at the individual judge level,
but it also held true at the court level.  The greater the extent
to which the judiciary of each court emphasized the adminis-
trator’s role orientation, the shorter the average amount of time
that each court took to resolve cases.  
Additionally, this research made several sage suggestions
that went beyond the immediate conclusions.  One observa-
tion was that judges are likely to adhere to different combina-
tions of role orientations.  No one orientation is likely to be all-
inclusive for many individual judges.  Another observation
was that expectations can and likely will change over time.
Expectations held by judges reflect their circumstances to
some degree, especially perceived challenges.  In a sense, to say
that there have been changes in judicial priorities is another
way of saying that expectations have changed.
Another study that connected judicial role orientations to
behavior concerned trial judges in California and Iowa and
their sentencing decisions in 1976.7 Here, the expectations of
judges were measured to determine if there was a single
dimension underlying their views.  The research advanced the
hypothesis that the essential nature of the judicial role orien-
tation is whether a judge believes that it is proper for extra-
legal stimuli (e.g., their own views and behavior) to influence
his or her decisions more than legal stimuli (e.g., recommen-
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dation of a district attorney).  The findings suggest that judges
who do give legitimacy to extralegal factors sentence defen-
dants more leniently than those who do not.  However, the
judges who emphasized legal factors were not a closely knit
group.  Some of them imposed severe sentences, but others
imposed more lenient ones.
A third proposition is that judicial role orientations exist
beyond the borders of the American common-law adversary
system.  Following in the research tradition used in the previ-
ous studies of American judges, researchers in 1974 sought to
see if judges in Switzerland and Austria exhibited expectations
concerning their work.  All German-speaking appellate judges
were asked to respond to a battery of questions concerning the
weight they gave to a series of factors in making their deci-
sions.8
The investigators concluded that the judges under study did
have definite expectations concerning two key dimensions: (1)
the weight given to precedent and (2) the weight given to the
litigants in individual cases versus the public.
Dividing each dimension into halves produced a fourfold
typology of role orientations.  They were:
• The Law Applier—emphasizes precedent and individual
litigants.
• The Law Extender—emphasizes precedent and the public.
• The Mediator—emphasizes the individual and deempha-
sizes the importance of precedent.
• The Policy Maker—emphasizes the public and deempha-
sizes the importance of precedent.
In addition to suggesting the generality of the concept of
judicial role, the research suggests a judge’s expectations
include more than what he or she thinks a judge is supposed
to do in making decisions.  Judges are cognizant of the role of
previous courts in society and of other participants in the jus-
tice system.
A fourth proposition is that judicial roles are critical inter-
vening factors between case management policies and the
degree of the policies’ successes.  Researchers have asked the
question, “Why do courts with the same case management
policies and procedures governing the resolution of cases vary
substantially in the time taken to resolve cases?” The answer is
that there are some judicial role orientations that inhibit the
effectiveness of case management policies and others that
enhance policy effectiveness.  
Based on interviews and observations of federal district
court judges in Los Angeles, Miami, and New Orleans in
1977,9 three sets of expecta-
tions seemed to be associ-
ated with the pace of litiga-
tion: the degree of a judge’s
perceived need to control
attorneys, the perceived
need to encourage settle-
ment, and the perceived
quality of justice shaped to
a judge’s willingness to use
available policies and pro-
cedures of case manage-
ment.  Judges who believe
that their job calls for them
to control litigation and
encourage settlement, and
who do not see case man-
agement as sacrificing quality, tend to resolve cases faster than
those judges with opposite expectations of what their jobs
entail. 
A fifth and final proposition is that judicial expectations are
manifestly discernable in how judges make decisions.  The
connection between judicial expectations and decisions is not
a “black box.”   This idea is clearly a new addition to the study
of judicial roles because the previous research mentioned
above in the discussion of the first four propositions had exam-
ined only the nature of either judicial expectations or judicial
decisions.  How the expectations are translated into decisions
has not been a topic until a recent study of prisoner litigation
in the federal court system.
That study argues that federal court judges followed a par-
ticular role in crafting decisions beginning in the 1960s toward
the conditions of state prisons.10 The thesis of the study is that
judges took a policy-making role and developed a body of legal
doctrine that was the basis for their intervention and the set-
ting of prison standards, such as the maximum number of pris-
oners, access to the courts, medical care, recreational opportu-
nities, and so forth.  Furthermore, judicial policy making was
similar but not identical to legislative and executive policy
making.  Judges followed the basic steps that legislators and
executives follow in responding to problems.  The researchers
claim that the basic decision-making steps of problem defini-
tion, goal identification, search for alternatives, selection of the
most promising alternative, and implementation were observ-
able in how the federal judiciary responded to challenges to
prison conditions.  The steps were not exactly the same as in
legislative and executive decision making because the judges
were creating doctrine. Their decision-making process was just
as discernable, however, as in the case of legislative and exec-
utive decision making.
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11. Previous research on the role of a judge has focused primarily on
the expectations held by the judges themselves.  There has been
little effort to measure the expectations of others outside the
courts (e.g., litigants, attorneys, policy makers, and the attentive
public).  Hence, when considering changes in expectations, there
is some ambiguity.  Whose expectations are we talking about
exactly?  Looking at recent literature, which focuses on the rise of
problem solving courts and judges as problem solvers, the expec-
tations calling for change seem to include both judges and court
reformers.  I mention this ambiguity because I offer my thoughts
on implications based on the assumption that the changing
expectations involve both judges and others.
12. The idea that courts and individual judges within courts hold
multiple combinations of distinct expectations is related to
research now being conducted at the National Center for State
Courts.  That project focuses on court culture and performance.
It is pursuing the hypothesis that those distinctive combinations
of judicial and court staff expectations make up distinctive cul-
tures among courts and that different court cultures lead to dif-
ferent performance outcomes.
Summing up, the research lit-
erature affirms the correctness of
the cynosure of contemporary
court reformers.11 If changes in
judicial decisions and the use of
new procedures are desired, then
efforts rightly are focused on
changing judicial role orienta-
tions.  New expectations coupled
with new policies will trump the
effects of new policies alone
every time.
There are two limitations to
the literature reviewed here.  One
of them arises because research on judicial roles has not con-
tinued into the present.  Thus, there is no available catalog of
expectations that connects specific subsets of expectations to
particular goals of contemporary court reform, such as access
to justice, expedition and timeliness, fairness and integrity,
clarity of decisions, and so forth.  As a result, there is no guide
currently available that charts the extent to which a combina-
tion of judicial expectations in a court leads to particular com-
binations of court performance.12
A second limitation is that there is no prescriptive package
that contains the mechanisms for changing expectations.
Researchers recognize this limitation and fall back on the tradi-
tional ingredient of education and training.   Researchers have
left those “details” to others.  Nevertheless, despite these limi-
tations, it is worthwhile to begin sketching out the implications
of changing expectations as a way to understand more fully the
meaning and significance of changing judicial roles.
III.  IMPLICATIONS OF CHANGING JUDICIAL
EXPECTATIONS
A.  A Short History of Contemporary Court Reform
During the past 25 years, there have been multiple court
reforms that have gained national attention and varying appli-
cations of particular reforms.  The enduring significance of
these reforms is a matter of judgment, so the following reforms
are offered as illustrations, not as a definitive list. The reforms
include the following:  
• The development of pretrial release and diversion policies
under the general topic of “bail reform” in the 1960s.
• The development of case management in the 1970s.
• The development of alternative dispute resolution efforts
in the 1970s.
• The development of drug courts in the 1980s.
• The broader development of specialized courts (e.g., com-
munity, gun, and mental health) under the general topic of
“problem-solving courts” in the 1990s.
Certainly all of these court reforms had precursors before
they attracted widespread attention.  However, despite their
particular historical lineages, these reforms share some impor-
tant and interesting attributes.  They tended to be created by
individuals either within or close to the courts themselves
rather than being inspired by legislative or executive action (as
contrasted with tort reform and sentencing reform, which gen-
erally were inspired by legislative action).  Even if “outsiders”
were present at creation, these reforms quickly were grafted
onto existing court procedures.  To a considerable extent, the
integration of new policies and procedures into ongoing trial
court systems boosted the stock of those court administrators
who were especially competent at making the new and the old
work smoothly and effectively. And all of these reforms led to
the formation of professional associations that fostered or
offered education and training programs for judges to attend
for inspiration and knowledge building.  For all these reasons,
it seems reasonable to assume that changing judicial expecta-
tions were part of these reforms.
B.  The Implications
Court reforms not only have their immediate, direct conse-
quences.  Because the reforms involve changing role orienta-
tions and role behavior, they have implications for the institu-
tion of the judiciary and its place in society and government.
These implications are important to understand because they
illuminate the profundity of changing judicial roles.  The fol-
lowing five implications are offered as among the most sub-
stantial:
There is a change in the nature and source of information
deemed essential to support judicial decision making.  Judges
not only make different decisions when they shift their role
orientations, but the bases for their decisions shift.  For exam-
ple, recommendations for bail based on measures of a defen-
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dant’s likelihood of making court appearances are a qualitative
change from previous practices in most courts.
There is a change in the nature and range of viable alterna-
tives for judges to consider in decision making.  As an illustra-
tion, case management is less about telling a judge that he or
she must meet a particular deadline in a particular way than
suggesting there are alternative ways to screening and calen-
daring cases (e.g., case differentiation is an alternative to the
practice of “first in, first out”).
Experts emerge who are knowledgeable in gathering and
analyzing new information and who are knowledgeable in
fashioning ways of integrating new procedures into court pro-
cedures.  This implication signals the rise of court manage-
ment in the broadest sense.  Contrary to the idea that case
management represents the rise of managerial judges, all of
these reforms represent the rise of managerial nonjudges.  As
an illustration, one reason for the success of mediation in the
thorny area of workers’ compensation is that mediation has
acquired a managerial aspect that it never had before.13 Hence,
judges may become less managerial than before if they change
their expectations and permit others to manage.
Taken together, the first three implications suggest a fourth
implication.  Changing expectations can cost a lot of money.
Information, experts, and management all call for resources.
As a result, visionaries, court reformers, and judges need to
think through thoroughly the priority and timing of court
reforms and corresponding changes in judicial expectations.  
The final implication builds on the fourth implication and
concerns the source of the money connected to the social
reforms. To a very great extent, resources made available by the
United States Department of Justice have fueled all of the
reforms mentioned above. Without automatically asserting
that this situation is a benign bestowing of federal largesse or a
corruption of the state judiciary, it is important to think about
this relationship. It seems fair to ask:  Are state judges chang-
ing their expectations and their behavior to secure resources? 
If we assume that the third branch of state government is in
a position of limited and dwindling resources, the possibility of
being able to secure an extra judicial position through the
acquisition of federal resources might seem attractive. As a
result, is the role of the judge changing because of conscious
policy choices that the change is warranted because it is the
right thing to do? Or is the role changed merely because the
carrot of additional resources is available if such changes are
made?
IV.  CONCLUSION
The literature on judicial roles, recent reforms of court poli-
cies, and the implications of past changes in judicial role ori-
entations and role behavior have convergent conclusions. The
expectations that judges have on how they should act in mak-
ing decisions have profound consequences. The behavior of
judges is altered.  This in turn means that litigants are treated
differently. In addition to
these consequences, there are
implications that arise from
changes in judicial role orien-
tations and role behavior.
These implications concern
the essential elements of judi-
cial decision-making, includ-
ing what is defined as relevant
information, appropriate and
viable decision making alter-
natives, the input and advice
of experts, the prominence
and role of court administra-
tors, and the source of
resources available for the
judiciary to seek.
Appealing to the future,
there are three fundamental
recommendations that arise
from these conclusions and
implications. First, it is essen-
tial to know much more than
we currently know about the expectations of judges. The last
studies of judicial role orientations and role behavior occurred
several years ago. They likely have more value at a general level
than at the street level where contemporary discussions are
taking place.   Yet it remains absolutely important to know the
expectations that judges have, including their views on alter-
native ways of making decisions. 
Judges need to be asked whether that they agree or disagree
that they should make decisions in an impartial, fact-finding,
and independent manner. Or should they make them in more
of a partner’s role along with many other partners in amelio-
rating problems vexing litigants? Obviously, the exact wording
of questions and their measurement require care and attention,
but the history of past scholarship provides a firm foundation. 
Additionally, judges need to be asked about how they spend
their time. Here the possible categories should parallel the
alternative ways of making judicial decisions. Finally, judges
should be asked how they would like to spend their time and
how they would like to make decisions. These three clusters of
questions should be asked in national, regional, and state sur-
veys of judges. The information would give everyone a much
more accurate sense of what today’s judicial roles are and what
judges think of prospective changes in role orientations.
Second, judges need to begin more formal and structured
dialogues on the desirability and direction of changes in role
orientations and corresponding court reforms. Policy changes
do not happen naturally. And role changes do not happen
because of some inexorable set of forces. A judge’s role is the
product of conscious choices.  Because those choices have
important and substantial consequences and implications, the
judiciary has a responsibility to talk through the advantages
To a very great
extent, resources
made available
by the United
States Department
of Justice have
fueled all of 
the reforms 
mentioned above.
It seems fair to
ask: Are state
judges changing
their expectations
and their 
behavior to 
secure resources?
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and disadvantages of role changes. The allure of federal dollars
underscores the importance of this dialogue. Certainly, the
judiciary does not want to be or appear unconscious of the con-
nection between court reforms and federal monies and act as if
they stumbled into federally supported reforms. The judiciary
should decide what shifts in their expectations are most war-
ranted in serving the ends of justice and ones that they feel
comfortable in adopting. Dialogue on this topic has begun, but
far more extensive discussion is needed. 
Third, research is needed on the relationship between cur-
rent judicial role orientations and role behavior. Is there a con-
nection between judicial expectations and court performance?
Previous studies have demonstrated an association between a
judge’s expectations and the timeliness of his docket.  But is
there any association with judicial expectations and court-level
outcomes in the areas of access, fairness, public trust and con-
fidence, and so forth?  Do judges who embrace particular role
orientations achieve particular levels of performance, as that
notion is currently used? This information would provide the
necessary grounding for the proposition that role orientations
do make a difference and thereby serve as a foundation for the
first two recommendations. Thus, there is a comprehensible set
of ways to clear the path toward more coherent court policies
in the future.
Court consultant Roger Hanson has worked
with the bar, courts, corrections, and law
enforcement agencies for more than 30 years. He
has written extensively on civil and justice
reforms and their effectiveness. He can be
reached in Williamsburg, Virginia, either at
www.factory7.com/~rah or at drhanson@wido-
maker.com.  
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Over the last 30 to 40 years, sweeping changes haveoccurred in societal attitudes toward divorce.  Thesechanges have been reflected in the laws governing
divorce and child custody as well as in the increasing rate of
divorce in the United States.  Just as divorce laws have changed,
making the divorce process much less difficult, there have also
been dramatic changes in custody and visitation statutes.  From
the mid-1800s until the 1960s, maternal preference was the
general rule in the large majority of judicial custody decisions.
During this period, the mother’s “natural  ability” to nurture the
child was considered as a primary factor in custody decisions.
This attitude was especially prominent with regard to younger
children or children of the “tender years.”  This “tender years
doctrine” developed in some jurisdictions through legislation
and in others through judicial opinion.  Reference was fre-
quently made in judicial opinions to the mother’s “natural supe-
riority” in caring for children.  There was little public contro-
versy regarding this attitude since it seemed to reflect societal
values at that time.  Thus, from the second half of the nine-
teenth century until the 1960s, legal norms dictated that cus-
tody of children belonged with the mother unless she was inca-
pable of providing appropriate care, usually due to mental ill-
ness or moral depravity as evidenced by adultery.1 A finding of
inability to care for the children was usually related to a finding
of fault in the divorce proceedings.
In the 1950s and 1960s, there was a subtle shift in the ten-
der years doctrine and maternal preference.  Less emphasis was
being placed on the mother’s natural superiority in judicial
opinions.  The courts began to emphasize the “best interests of
the child,” giving more discretion to judges to consider other
factors in custody decisions.  In many jurisdictions, however,
“the best interests of the child” standard was simply another
name for the “tender years doctrine” since most courts held
that maternal custody was usually in the best interests of the
child.  This shift in legal thought, however, did open the door
for the consideration of other factors.  This situation resulted in
slightly more frequent assignment of custody to fathers
although this shift was far from substantial.2
In the 1970s, social attitudes were again shifting.  The pref-
erence for maternal custody was being questioned on several
fronts.  More and more women were entering the workforce as
both part-time and full-time employees.  Thus, differences
between men and women were being reduced with regard to
their roles in the family.  In addition, the feminist movement
was questioning the assumption that only women could do
housework and raise children.  As a result, fathers were becom-
ing more involved in the parenting process at the same time
that divorce was becoming more frequent.  During this period,
two opposing positions were often considered by the courts
when determining the best interests of the child with regard to
custody decisions.  According to the traditional viewpoint, chil-
dren need a stable home life and, therefore, should not be shut-
tled back and forth from parent to parent on a regular basis.
The parent with whom the child lives should have almost
exclusive responsibility for raising the child, with only occa-
sional visitation with the noncustodial parent.  This position,
which had been used for many years, was supported by many
mental health professionals at the time and was reflected in the
book entitled Beyond the Best Interests of the Child by Goldstein,
Freud, and Solnit.3 Goldstein et al. also held that there should
be no court-ordered visitation and that visitation with the non-
custodial parent should be solely at the discretion of the custo-
dial parent.  This publication was frequently cited in judicial
decisions as well as in the legal literature.
The alternative viewpoint, which was emerging in the 1970s,
reflected parental desires for joint custody or a more equal shar-
ing of time with and responsibility for the children following
divorce.  This position reflected changing middle-class lifestyles
as well as demands from fathers’ groups for more active partic-
ipation in the parenting process.  As a result of pressure from
parents’ groups, joint custody legislation was passed rather
quickly and with little public opposition in the late 1970s and
early 1980s.  This legislation provided equal access to children
for both mothers and fathers.  At about the same time, states
were also passing gender neutral custody legislation, which
eliminated maternal preferences and the tender years doctrine.
There was a great deal of opposition to joint custody in the legal
and, to a lesser extent, the mental health communities.  As indi-
cated above, this approach ran counter to the opinions of some
in the mental health community.  There was also a great deal of
resistance from both attorneys and judges since joint custody
represented a dramatic change in the traditional approach to
this situation.4
At the present time, all states have provisions for gender
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neutral custody laws and joint custody arrangements.  Since
maternal custody is no longer automatic, and distinctions
between maternal and paternal roles have been blurred over the
past 30 years, judges must now consider a number of issues that
were not relevant in the past.  There has been a great deal of
speculation in the legal literature, however, that many judges
still have a preference for maternal custody.5
In approximately 90% of divorces involving minor children,
the parents reach  agreement on custody and visitation arrange-
ments.  This agreement is then approved by the court.  In the
remaining 10% of the cases, custody is contested and the deci-
sion must be made by the court.  Judges are expected to make
their decisions in the best interests of the child.  This standard,
however, gives judges a tremendous amount of discretion in
making these decisions.  Clearly, every judge has his or her own
set of opinions and presumptions regarding custody issues,
which affect rulings.  A number of authors have suggested that
judges are frequently free to impose their own personal values
due to the indeterminacy of the substantive standards that apply
in custody decisions.6 These conclusions are based primarily
on case law.  Case law itself, however, is not necessarily repre-
sentative of judicial attitudes in general, since published cases
represent only a small minority of actual decisions.    
Judges’ assumptions regarding various issues related to cus-
tody decisions have been assessed through the use of judicial
surveys in research done by the present author.  In one study,
Louisiana judges’ preferences for various custody and visitation
arrangements, as well as some of the factors considered in these
decisions, were examined.7 A similar study was completed with
Quebec Superior Court judges.8 In a third study, a variety of
issues dealing with Louisiana judges’ attitudes regarding cus-
tody issues were examined.9
THE SURVEY OF JUDGES
The purpose of the present study was to further assess judi-
cial assumptions regarding custody decisions, specifically as
they relate to the maternal preference issue.  Several authors
have suggested that maternal preference may still be the rule in
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many courts, with children of most ages, but especially when
children of the “tender years” (young children) are involved, in
spite of gender neutral custody laws in all jurisdictions.10 This
type of presumption could be justified if the judge assumes that
mothers are superior to fathers as parents, especially with
younger children.  Thus, given this assumption, it would be in
the child’s best interests to be placed in the custody of the
mother.  The impact of the age of the judge was also assessed in
the present research.  It was hypothesized that older judges may
be more inclined to favor maternal preference, while younger
judges may tend to view mothers and fathers on a more equal
basis.
In the present study, judges hearing custody cases in
Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee were surveyed
by mail.  The number of judges responding in each age bracket
was as follows:
30-39 5
40-49 60
50-59 47
60-69 26
70-79 7
No age listed 4
Because of the small numbers in the 30-39 and 70-79 brack-
ets, they were excluded from the analysis.  A list of items was
constructed to measure the judges’ beliefs with regard to mater-
nal preference in custody decisions.  The judges were asked to
respond to each item on a scale of 1 - 5, with 1 indicating
“Strongly Agree” and 5 indicating “Strongly Disagree.”  These
items, shown below, were grouped into five pairs, with one item
of each pair referring to the mother and an identical item refer-
ring to the father.  The results were evaluated by examining the
distribution of the judges’ responses, divided by age groups.  In
the following tabulation, judges’ responses of 1 or 2 were listed
under “Agree,” and responses of 4 or 5 were listed under
“Disagree.”  Responses of 3 were considered “Neutral” or
“Undecided” and were not listed below.  The numbers under
each category indicate the percentage of judges who gave that
response.  
A response of “Agree” to the “a” version of each item above
indicates a preference for the mother, while a response of
“Agree” to the “b” version indicates a preference for the father.
The reverse holds with regard to the “Disagree” category.  A
response of “Disagree” to the “a” version indicates a preference
for the father while a response of “Disagree” to the “b” version
indicates a preference for the mother.  
When examining the “Agree” column for items 1-4, the
results show far more “Agree” responses for mothers than for
fathers, which is indicative of a fairly consistent tendency
toward maternal preference by the judges.  There is also a defi-
nite pattern showing stronger signs of maternal preference with
older judges, compared to younger judges.  Some of these find-
ings are highlighted in the following paragraphs.
ITEM NO. AGE AGREE DISAGREE
1.a. Mothers are better  40-49 14 45
parents than fathers 50-59 21 32
due to more experience 60-69 28 24
raising children.
1.b. Fathers are better 40-49 0 63
parents than mothers 50-59 0 76
due to more experience 60-69 0 71
raising children.
2.a. Mothers are the 40-49 36 26
preferred custodian 50-59 35 31
when children are under 60-69 71 4
the age of 6.
2.b. Fathers are the 40-49 0 56
preferred custodian 50-59 1 66
when children are under 60-69 1 68
the age of 6.  
3.a. Children of all ages show 40-49 3 49
better adjustment when 50-59 10 39
living with the mother. 60-69 16 20
3.b. Children of all ages show 40-49 0 52
better adjustment when 50-59 0 66
living with the father. 60-69 0 63
4.a. Mothers, by nature, 40-49 5 39
make better parents 50-59 28 38
than fathers. 60-69 46 17
4.b. Fathers, by nature, 40-49 0 68
make better parents     50-59 6 70
than mothers. 60-69 0 84
5.a. A mother who has 40-49 97 3 
performed most of the 50-59 85 7
child’s nurturing and 60-69 96 0
maintenance activities   
would be favored in 
custody decisions.
5.b. A father who has 40-49 95 0 
performed most of the 50-59 90 2
child’s nurturing and 60-69 81 4
maintenance activities
would be favored in 
custody decisions.
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In examining Item 1, the percentage of judges agreeing that
mothers are better parents than fathers due to greater experi-
ence, increases as the age of the judge increases.  The percent-
age of judges disagreeing with the statement decreases as the
age of the judge decreases.  None of the judges felt that fathers
were better parents than mothers due to greater experience.  
Item 2 deals with the tender years doctrine, regarding cus-
tody of younger children.  The percentage of judges agreeing
that mothers are the preferred custodians of younger children
increased dramatically with the age of the judge, with 36% of
the youngest judges agreeing and 71% of the oldest judges
agreeing.  Only 2% of the judges in the entire sample felt that
fathers are the preferred custodians for younger children.
On Item 3, only a small minority of judges agreed that chil-
dren show better adjustment while living with the mother.
Even on this item, however, the percentage agreeing was great-
est for the oldest judges.  None of the judges agreed that chil-
dren showed better adjustment while living with the father.  
On Item 4, the judges were asked whether fathers or moth-
ers made better parents.  With regard to mothers, there was a
definite age trend, with only 5% of the youngest judges agree-
ing that mothers make better parents than fathers, while 46% of
the oldest judges agreed with that statement.  Only 6% of the
entire sample agreed that fathers make better parents than
mothers, with no age differences evident.
Item 5 deals with the primary caretaker standard.  Judges
were asked if the parent who had performed most of the child’s
care-taking activities would be favored in custody decisions.
The judges in all age groups overwhelmingly agreed, whether
that parent was the mother or father.  Even on this Item, how-
ever, there was a slight tendency toward maternal preference
among the oldest age group.  When the question referred to a
mother who had done most of the care-taking activities for the
child, 96% of the oldest judges agreed that she would be favored
in custody decisions.  When the same question referred to a
father who had done most of the child care, only 81% of the
oldest judges agreed that the father would be favored in the cus-
tody decision.  
The findings of maternal preference in the present study are
consistent with various reviews of appellate cases as well as the
opinions of a number of professionals in both the mental health
and legal fields, all of which indicate that maternal preference
still plays a definite role in many custody determinations.  For
example, Melton et al. concluded that maternal preference still
remains the norm in many jurisdictions, after reviewing appel-
late decisions in South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia.11
Emery described maternal preference as one of the  “unarticu-
lated values,” “implicit norms,” or “rules of thumb” used in
many jurisdictions to guide judicial decisions in custody
cases.12 Dotterweich and McKinney reviewed state bar associa-
tion studies of gender bias from Maryland, Missouri, Texas, and
Washington.  In summarizing the results of surveys of judges in
these states, they concluded that maternal preference is still
common among judges.  On one item used in these surveys,
judges were asked “Are custody awards made based on the
assumption that young children belong with their mothers?”
The results indicated that 44% of the judges answered “Always
or Usually” indicating support for the tender years doctrine and
maternal preference by almost half of the judges.  Item 2 in the
present study dealt with the same issue, with 42% of all judges
agreeing that children under the age of 6 should be with their
mothers.  Dotterweich and McKinney also reported that judges
were asked, “Do courts give fair consideration to fathers?”
Thiry-three percent of the judges answered “Always or Usually,”
indicating that two-thirds of the judges believed that fathers do
not usually get fair consideration in the courts.13
These types of assumptions held by judges often seem con-
sistent with certain societal norms.  In many groups within the
United States, there is still a strong belief that mothers should
raise the children, while the role of the fathers should be sec-
ondary.     
The fact that older judges exhibit a greater tendency toward
maternal preference seems to make intuitive sense.  Since
judges are given a great deal of latitude in deciding that which
is in the best interests of the child, it does not seem unusual that
a judge’s personal experiences and beliefs may play a role in
those decisions regarding child custody.  Judges who are cur-
rently in their 60s would have grown up primarily during the
1930s and 1940s when divorce was rare and family roles were
fixed, with mothers caring for children and doing housework,
while fathers were employed to provide income for the families.
The beliefs that children belonged with the mother were widely
accepted within American society during that era and were also
reflected in court cases at that time.  These attitudes regarding
family roles, established during childhood, and reinforced by
society in general at the time, are difficult to change later in life.
Judges who are currently in their 40s and 50s grew up pri-
marily during the 1950s to 1970s.  That time in our history
was a period of dramatic cultural change, with many women
entering the work force, resulting in drastic changes in family
structure and roles.  The divorce rate also increased dramati-
cally, with many children living in single-parent homes. Many
of these judges have had firsthand experience with working
mothers, fathers taking an active role in child care, single-par-
ent homes, and a general blurring of the roles between men
and women.  
A judge could justify this belief of maternal preference if
he/she believed that mothers, in general, are better parents than
fathers and that awarding custody to the mother is usually in
the best interests of the child. This belief appears to be preva-
lent among a substantial proportion of judges both in the pre-
sent study as well as in other studies.  Although mothers are the
primary custodial parent in 80% to 85% of all divorces involv-
ing children, the psychological literature indicates that chil-
dren’s overall adjustment following divorce does not differ
between those living with custodial mothers versus custodial
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fathers.  This finding holds true even with infants and young
children.14 Thus, the research literature does not appear to sup-
port the presumption that maternal preference is usually in the
best interests of the child.  Given the findings of equal parent-
ing abilities for mothers and fathers, it would seem that the best
interests of the child would be served through a gender neutral
assessment of the family as called for in state laws. 
CONCLUSIONS
Judges’ attitudes and opinions can affect custody arrange-
ments in a number of ways.  The most obvious impact occurs in
contested cases when judges must make the final decisions,
based on the information presented to the court.  Judges’ atti-
tudes can also have an impact on the process outside of the
courtroom.  Approximately 90% of custody matters are settled
before the parents come to court.  Although these arrangements
are considered voluntary, the negotiations are always completed
in the context of that which is permitted within the legal system,
or as Mnookin and Kornhauser have described, “Bargaining in
the shadow of the law.”15 A more accurate description might be
“bargaining in the shadow of the law and the judges’ assump-
tions.”  Thus, if an attorney is aware of the attitudes of a partic-
ular judge or a group of judges regarding various custody-related
issues, this information will have a very definite impact upon the
advice that is given to the client with regard to decisions either
to reach an agreement out of court or continue through the legal
process in which a judge will make the custody decision.  It has
even been suggested that a judge’s known attitudes may affect
the recommendations of court-ordered custody investigations
by mental health professionals, as the investigator sometimes
tries to present recommendations that are consistent with a
judge’s previous rulings.16 Thus, the attitudes of a judge can
reach well beyond the decisions that are actually made by the
court in disputed cases. 
The indeterminancy of statutes dealing with divorce and
custody issues allows the judiciary a great deal of flexibility in
dealing with the widely varying circumstances of individual
families.  At the same time, this flexibility places tremendous
responsibility upon the court to define the “best interests” for a
given family.  The manner in which a particular judge may
define “best interests” will depend on the assumptions that the
judge is making about child development and parent-child rela-
tionships.  These assumptions may be based on information
from various sources.  These sources may include the judge’s
own family experiences, going back to his or her own child-
hood, the judge’s experience as a parent, “common sense”
derived from a variety of life experiences, the judge’s participa-
tion in continuing education and self-study dealing with child
development, information derived from mental health experts
who have testified in the court, tradition and precedents from
the legal system, and many other possible sources.  Given the
results of the present study, indicating that judges’ attitudes
about custody issues may vary depending on their generation
and previous experiences, it may be worthwhile for all judges
dealing with these types of cases to examine their own assump-
tions and determine how these assumptions relate to current
sources of information and research on this topic.
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1. OFF. OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
STRATEGY 2000 ANNUAL REPORT (2000) at 115–116.  Seventy-four
million Americans have tried an illicit drug at least once in their
lifetime; 2.4 million have tried heroin at least once, 22.1 million
have tried cocaine at least once, and 4.6 million have used crack
at least once.  OFF. OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, DATA
SNAPSHOT–DRUG ABUSE IN AMERICA 1998 (1998) at 32-33. In 1999,
1,254,577 Americans were in federal and state prisons.  OFF. OF
NAT’L. DRUG CONTROL POLICY (March 2001), infra note 2 at 1.  
2. OFF. OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME AND JUSTICE
ATLAS 2001 UPDATE (2001) at 5.  The Office of National Drug
Control Policy recently reported the following:
In 1999, approximately 6.3 million adults—3.1% of the
Nation’s adult population—were under correctional super-
vision (that is, incarceration, probation or parole).  Drug
offenders accounted for 21% (236,800) of the State prison
population in 1998, up from 6% (19,000) in 1980, and 59%
(55,984) of the Federal prison population in 1998, up from
25% (4,749) in 1980.  Also, in 1998, an estimated 26%
(152,000) of all inmates under local supervision were
incarcerated for drug offenses. This increase in the drug
offender prison population mirrors the steady increase in
arrests for drug offenses.
OFF. OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, DRUG TREATMENT IN THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FACT SHEET (March 2001) at 1.   
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(May 2001).
6. OFF. OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, PULSE CHECK:  NATIONAL
TRENDS IN DRUG ABUSE (Summer 1998), at i.
7. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN. & THE NAT’L GUARD, DRUGS OF ABUSE
(1997) at 13.
8. Id.
9. Id. The DEA estimated that purity levels of heroin in 1981 were
7%, and in 1998 the average purity rate was 41 % nationwide.
Estaban Parra, infra note 18.  The ingestion of heroin either by
smoking or snorting has increased from 55% in 1994 to 71% in
1997.  OFF. OF NAT’L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, supra note 6 at 30.
Drug use in the United States has been cited for thegrowth in American prisons over the past decade.Heroin, once considered a drug to be avoided and
scorned, has had resurgence in use by middle-class youth and
white-collar professionals due to the increased purity of the
drug and the lack of need to use needles for ingestion.
Naltrexone has been used as a method of helping heroin
addicts to end their drug dependency, but such programs have
limitations in their use and effectiveness. This paper is drawn
from an evaluation of a drug treatment program in
Wilmington, Delaware.  The goal of this paper is to review the
factors that lead to successful drug treatment and the limita-
tions on the success of drug treatment that the judiciary
should consider when sentencing drug addicts. 
More than 13 million Americans used an illicit drug at least
once in 1998, and 977,000 Americans classified themselves as
hardcore heroin users in 1999.1 The growth of increased drug
use has impacted the criminal justice system.  “In 1997, over
one third of prison commitments involved drug offenses, com-
pared to only 7% in 1980.  In 1980, about half of all commit-
ments were for violent offenses; by 1997, only about one third
were.”2 In 1999 Americans spent an estimated $63.2 billion
for cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, and other illicit
drugs.3  The impact of this increased drug use can be seen in
the fact that the number of Americans incarcerated (prison
only) reached more than one million (1,078,542) in 1995 for
the first time in U.S. history.4 According to the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, the percentage of prisoners in federal prison
incarcerated for dugs increased from 57.9% of the total popu-
lation in 1991 to 62.6% in 1997 and the percentage of drug
offenders in state prisons decreased from 21.3% of the total
population in 1991 to 20.7% in 1997.5
“The majority of heroin users are still older, chronic users
who inject the drug.  At the same time, the number of new,
young users who snort or smoke the drug continues to rise.”6
According to the DEA, the “typical heroin user today con-
sumes more heroin than a typical user did just a decade ago,
which is not surprising given the higher purity currently avail-
able at the street level.”7 Historically heroin is taken intra-
venously, subcutaneously (under the skin), or intramuscu-
larly8 but due to the high level of purity (as high as 98%), it
can be snorted or smoked.  The purity of the heroin now
makes heroin snorting possible, and makes heroin more
“appealing to new users because it eliminates both the fear of
acquiring syringe-borne diseases . . . and the historical stigma
attached to intravenous heroin use.”9
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12. Supra note 6 at 3. “The hub of the area heroin trade [is in] the
Kensington section of Philadelphia. That’s where many Delaware
addicts go to get [their heroin]. Through the first 10 months of
1998 [there were] 716 arrests for heroin” of which 30 were peo-
ple from Delaware.  Tom Feeney & Esteban Parra (1998). Hooked
on Heroin: Police Sound the Alarm, SUNDAY NEWS JOURNAL, Nov. 29.
1998, at A1.
13. New Castle County Police Heroin Alert Task Force, supra note 11.
14. Feeney & Parra, supra note 12.
15. Id. at A1.
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17. DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN. & THE NAT’L GUARD, supra note 7 at
13.
18. New Castle County Heroin Alert Task Force, supra note 11.  DEA
investigations have discovered that heroin sold in Dover and Kent
County originates in New York City. The heroin market in the
U.S. is dominated by two sources, Columbia and Mexico.
Columbian heroin is dominant along the east coast in cities like
Boston, New York City, Newark, N.J., and Philadelphia.
Columbian heroin averages at almost 68% pure, but the
Columbian heroin in Dover has been found in the high 90%
range. The heroin purity rate in Dover has been found to be
higher than in Philadelphia, which is about 80%. The combina-
tion of the high purity rate of heroin in Delaware and the low cost
is blamed for the increase of heroin use in suburban areas in
Delaware. Estaban Parra, Purity Is Part of the Local Problem,
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Liability and Treatment for Dependence, in ADDICTION POTENTIAL OF
ABUSED DRUGS AND DRUG CLASSES (Barry Stimmel ed., 1990) 
20. Kaplan & Sadock, supra note 19 at 844.
21. Id. “Heroin crosses the blood-brain barrier more rapidly than
morphine and produces greater euphoric effects when given in
equal doses. Once in the brain, heroin is hydrolyzed to morphine
almost immediately.”  Id. at 31.  Both heroin and morphine are
derivatives of opium and as such are considered opiates.
Opiates attach to the opioid receptors of the brain and produce
similar euphoric and pleasure reactions to natural occurring pain
suppressants in the brain (endorphins and enkephalins) which
also attach to the opioid receptors of the brain. SUBSTANCE ABUSE
AND MENTAL HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN. (SAMSHA), NALTREXONE AND
ALCOHOLISM TREATMENT:  TREATMENT IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL
(TIP) (1998), series #28 at 28.  Both endogenous opioids (endor-
phins and enkephalins) and exogenous opiates (heroin and mor-
phine) act as neurotransmitters that transfer information through
the nervous system. In the case of opioid neurotransmitters, the
information is pain relief and pleasure responses.  See infra note
32 for discussion on the cycle of addiction theory.
22. Kaplan & Sadock, supra note 19 at 844.
23. Id.
24. Id. See also, infra note 25, and Robert Greenstein et al., Methadone
and Naltrexone in the Treatment of Heroin Dependence, 7
PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA, 671 (1984). 
In Newark, Delaware, the purity of heroin has been found
to range from 20% to 90%.10 The New Castle County Police
have reported that purity levels have been found to be as high
as 97% in Dover, Delaware.11 According to the Office of
National Drug Control Policy, Newark, Delaware sources
report that there has been a “‘definite increase in teenage
users’. . . dealers, some from nearby Philadelphia, are making
a clear attempt to establish a new market.  For example, by
encouraging young females to begin use, dealers hope to
attract older male users.  In that area, users start at around 13,
and the source reports that there are ‘chronic’ users aged 15 -
17.”12 It has recently been reported that between 1993 and
1995, 88% of new heroin users were between the ages of 12 to
25 years old.13 The “average age of addicts seeking treatment
is getting younger.   In 1993, only 17.2 percent of heroin
addicts who reported for treatment were 24 or younger.  By
1997, the percentage had climbed to 31.7 percent.”14 The
number of people who are treated for heroin addiction in
Delaware has increased from 336 in 1991 to 1,767 in 1997, an
increase of 426%.15 The impact of the increase in heroin usage
can be seen in the number of heroin-related deaths.  Deaths
related to heroin have increased from 14 in 1991, to 29 in
1997.16 The national average of heroin purity is 35%.17 The
average purity level for heroin in Delaware is 85%.18
In an effort to deal with the growing heroin use problem in
Delaware, SODAT-Delaware, Inc., received more than
$1,650,000 over a three-year period (1995–1997) to imple-
ment an intensive outpatient therapy program (SNAP), which
uses the blocking medication nal-
trexone to assist heroin addicts in
their attempts to discontinue the
use of heroin and other drugs and
to promote pro-social behavior
with no new criminal arrest.
A BRIEF REVIEW ON THE USE
OF HEROIN AND
NALTREXONE 
Heroin is a semi-synthetic
derivative of opium prepared from morphine.19 Heroin was
first introduced into medicine in 1898 and was used as a pain
medication until the addictive nature of opioids in general was
found.20 Heroin is classified as a narcotic due to its ability to
produce mood and behavior changes, potential for dependence
and tolerance following continued use, and derivation from
opium.21 In 1914 the Harrison Act was passed, which is
“interpreted as excluding the provision of opioids to addicts as
a legitimate medical use.”22 Although the use of opiates was
illegal, “heroin addiction persisted and its prevalence rose fol-
lowing World War II [and by] the early 1960’s [many recom-
mended] remedicalizing heroin distribution as a way to reduce
crime associated with heroin addiction.”23
With the increase of heroin addiction in the U.S. Military
during the Vietnam War and in society as a whole, federal
funds were expended for both research and treatment of heroin
addicts.24 Over the past 30 years, various techniques have
[B]etween 1993
and 1995, 88%
of new heroin
users were
between the
ages of 18 to
25 years old.
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25. Kaplan & Sadock, supra note 19 at 844.  For a review of early
research on naltrexone in heroin addiction, see Richard Resenick
et al., Narcotic Antagonists in the Treatment of Opioid Dependence:
Review and Commentary, 20 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY, 116
(1979). See also, DEMETRIOS JULIUS & PIERRE RENAULT, NARCOTIC
ANTAGONISTS: NALTREXONE (National Institute on Drug Abuse
Research Monograph # 9, 1976),which encompasses 25 articles
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were funded by the National Institute on Drug Abuse, U.S.
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
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DEPENDENCE, 231 (1994), which found naltrexone to be effective
in blocking the physiological and psychological effects of heroin
for at least 48 and 72 hours, respectively.  Opioid antagonists like
naltrexone “block opioid receptors and reverse the effects of
endogenous opioid peptides as well as exogenous opiates [and it
is theorized that] these agents may prevent the reinforcing effects”
of consumption of heroin. SAMHSA, supra note 21 at 32.  
27. DRUG FACTS AND COMPARISONS (1998) at 3579. See also, Joseph
Volpicelli, Naltrexone and the Treatment of Alcohol Dependence, 18
ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD: JOURNAL NAT’L INST. ON ALCOHOL
ABUSE AND ALCOHOLISM 272 (1994). 
28. Kaplan & Sadock, supra note 19 at 857.  See, Abraham Wikler,
Dynamics of Drug Dependence: Implications of a Conditioning
Theory for Research and Treatment, 28 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL
PSYCHIATRY 611 (1973), and Wikler, Conditioning Factors in Opiate
Addiction and Relapse, in NARCOTICS (Daniel Wilder and Gene
Kassenbaum eds., 1965) at 85 for early work on the use of nar-
cotic antagonists for treating heroin addiction.   See also, Karen
Allen, Essential Concepts of Addiction for General Nursing Practice,
33 NURSING CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 1.
29. Kaplan & Sadock, supra note 19 at 857.  See also, Charles O’Brien
et al., Use of Naltrexone to Extinguish Opioid-Conditioned
Responses, 45 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 53.
30. See Avram Goldstein, Naltrexone in the Management of Heroin
Addiction: Critique of the Rationale, in NARCOTIC ANTAGONISTS:
NALTREXONE (National Institute on Drug Abuse Research
Monograph # 9) (Demtrios Julius & Pierre Renault eds., 1976)
158, 159.  See also, Richard Resinick, et al., supra note 25, and
Richard Resnick & Elaine Schuyten-Resnick, A Point of View
Concerning Treatment Approaches with Narcotic Antagonists, in
NARCOTIC ANTAGONISTS: NALTREXONE 84 (1976).
31. Avram Goldstein, supra note 30 at 159.  “Relapse to heroin use in
abstinent ex-addicts is rarely cogitated and planned in advance.
Conditioned abstinence (‘craving’) can be elicited by accidental
encounters with active addicts . . . or other major stress.” Id. On
the issue of behavior, Goldstein noted that humans have the abil-
ity to “anticipate consequences and to modify our behavior
accordingly. In this connection, the observation that naltrexone
can diminish ‘craving’ is entirely understandable, since ‘craving’ is
generally elicited by the possibility of obtaining a drug rather than
by its unavailability. It follows from this analysis that naltrexone
can only work if the patient understands how it works and
believes that it will work.” Id. at 159–160.  Goldstein also asserted
that because the patient knows that the naltrexone will block the
affects of heroin and thus taking the drug will be futile, “it is not
surprising that many subjects taking naltrexone may not use
been developed to treat heroin
addicts.  One of the treatment
methods developed over the
past 25 years involves the use of
long-acting opioid antagonists
for heroin addicts.25 Antagonist
treatment methods differ from
substitution (maintenance)
treatment programs in that the
antagonist programs use med-
ication to eliminate an addic-
tion.  Substitution treatment
methods use one drug,
methadone, for example, as a
replacement for another drug,
heroin.  The SNAP program was
an antagonist treatment pro-
gram that used the opioid
antagonist naltrexone, which
“blocks or reverses the physiologic and psychological effects of
opioids by binding opiate receptors” in the brain.26
Naltrexone “prevents or reverses opioid effects [and] will pre-
cipitate abstinence . . . in narcotic addiction.”27 The use of nal-
trexone is based on “the assumption that classically conditioned
withdrawal symptoms and operantly reinforced drug seeking
behaviors contribute to high relapse”28 in heroin addicts. 
Theoretically, by blocking the euphoric effects of
opioids, treatment with antagonists would lead to
the extinction of operantly reinforced drug seeking;
by preventing the reestablishment of physical
dependence, treatment with antagonists also leads
to the eventual extinction of conditioned with-
drawal phenomena.  Recently, . . . empirical and lab-
oratory observations [show] patients taking nal-
trexone experience less craving in the presence of
opioid-related cues, presumably because, on a cog-
nitive basis, they are aware that they are unable to
experience the opioid effects.29
Early studies and theoretical use of naltrexone proposed that
naltrexone would be effective in dealing with impulsive and
compulsive heroin use in addicts who are in treatment.30 Early
researchers of heroin addiction recognized that recovering
heroin addicts could recidivate and develop full addiction due
to impulsive heroin use by environmental stimuli.  The stimuli
could be an interaction between the recovering addict and a
friend, whom the addict had a history of heroin use with, or
being in a neighborhood in which heroin is used.  The stimulus
causes a craving for the heroin that could cause readdiction.
Goldstein explained that “naltrexone can protect against impul-
sive use and can prevent the consequences of impulsive use.
The protective medication, [the naltrexone], is taken at a time
when motivation [to end the addiction] is high, then later, if
circumstances arise that would typically lead to use the agonist
drug [heroin], there is a strong reason to avoid that behavior”
because the subject knows the heroin will not have any effect.31
Naltrexone can also aid in the reduction of compulsive addic-
tion.  The cognitive knowledge that the use of the heroin will
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in treatment.
not have an effect reduces the obsessing over the craving for the
heroin.  Thus naltrexone will assist the addict in developing
behavior re-enforcers to resist the thoughts and desires for the
drug, in turn reducing compulsive addictive behavior.
Although use of naltrexone has been found to block the
effects of heroin, one of the biggest problems in heroin addic-
tion32 treatment, along with heroin detoxification of addicts, is
low compliance in taking the naltrexone by the addicts and
their high dropout rate.33 Kaplan and Sadock noted that in one
study, “the dropout rate was quite high: 25 percent of subjects
who started treatment dropped out within two weeks; 94 per-
cent stopped by nine months.”34 In a study in Israel, the aver-
age retention rate for program participants was 56.3 days.35
Out of a total of 32 patients, 58 percent completed the pro-
gram.36 Forty percent of the patients dropped out of the pro-
gram within two weeks, and 60% of the patients who dropped
out did so within the remaining ten weeks of the program.37
PROGRAM THEORY DESCRIPTION
The SNAP program was based on the theory that the heroin
addict (once detoxification is completed) will be assisted in end-
ing his or her heroin addiction if medication was provided that
blocked the effects of the heroin.  The heroin-blocking medica-
tion provided was naltrexone.  Naltrexone is an orally adminis-
tered medication, which prevents the uptake and effects of opi-
oid compounds.  Thus, when taking this medication, any person
who uses heroin by any route
will not experience any effects
whatsoever. The naltrexone
protocol was used in conjunc-
tion with intensive outpatient
therapy and therapeutic case
management services.
The general focus of the
SNAP treatment was on
client stabilization, mainte-
nance of a drug-free and
crime-free lifestyle, a recov-
ery-oriented support net-
work, and relapse prevention
education.  The SNAP pro-
gram was designed to provide
a four-phase treatment strat-
egy for heroin addicts over a
12-to-18-month period.
METHODOLOGY
Between October 7, 1993, and July 22, 1998, the SNAP pro-
gram provided 73 participants naltrexone as part of their treat-
ment for heroin addiction.  Data was collected from the case
files of all 73 participants, which included basic demographic
information (age, gender, race), employment status, history of
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receptor blocking pharmacological agents in the battle to reduce
relapse in early recovery.” Id.  See also, D. Colin Drummond.
Theories of Drug Craving, Ancient and Modern, 96 ADDICTION 33
(2000). For a discussion on opiate receptor sites within the brain,
see Roy Wise, Opiate Reward: Sites and Substrates, 13
NEUROSCIENCE AND BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEW, Summer-Fall 1989, 129,
and Jane Stewart, supra note 31.
33. High dropout rates can be partially explained by the nature of
addiction.  As noted in footnotes 21 and 32, the consumption of
heroin produces a pleasurable experience that can be stronger
than natural pleasurable experiences. The experience in turn pro-
duces chemical reinforcers to the use of heroin. The reduction or
stopping of the behavior (heroin use) produces the chemical rein-
forcers in the brain, which in turn produce craving for the behav-
ior (heroin use). The craving in turn produces the continuation of
the behavior (heroin use). Negative reinforcement and addiction
are achieved. Treatment programs using naltrexone block the
pleasure reaction of opiates and opioids in the brain. But the psy-
chological desire for the heroin and the resulting pleasure from
using the drug causes the person to stop taking the naltrexone in
order to have the heroin have its desired effect. It is here that
treatment modalities like cognitive therapy and group therapy can
have an effect, for therapy addresses the emotional need for the
heroin and how to resist the need.
34. Kaplan & Sadock, supra note 19 at 857.   See also, Emi Shufman
et al., The Efficacy of Naltrexone in Preventing Reabuse of Heroin
after Detoxification, 35 SOCIETY OF BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 935
(1994).
35. Emi Shufman et al., supra note 34 at 939.  “In this study, 75% of
the patients stayed in the program after 1 month, and 58% com-
pleted the 3 months treatment period.” Id.at 942.
36. Id. at 942.
37. Id. at 939.
heroin to test and verify the protection.” Id. at 159.  For research
showing that heroin addicts will test the blocking ability of nal-
trexone, see infra note 40. For a study looking at impulsive heroin
addicts and self-control, see Gregory Madden et al., Impulsive and
Self-Control Choices in Opioid-Dependent Patients and Non-Drug-
Using Control Participants: Drug and Monetary Rewards, 5
EXPERIMENTS IN CLINICAL PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 256 (1997).  For a
study looking at compulsive use of heroin and the opioid recep-
tors and naltrexone, see Jane Stewart, Conditioned and
Unconditioned Drug Effects in Relapse to Opiate and Stimulant Drug
Self-Administration, PROGRESS IN NEUROPSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY &
BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 591 (1983).
32. In the development of the cycle of addiction, the intake of heroin
leads to an increase in opioid receptor activity. “Once opioid
receptor activity has been primed, more [heroin] is needed to
ensure continued opioid receptor activity. Therefore, a cycle may
ensue during which the desire to increase or recapture feelings of
pleasure or euphoria is translated into cravings for [the heroin].
The loss of control that follows the initial consumption of a rein-
forcing agent [the heroin] may provide the root mechanism for
. . . addictive behavior.”  SAMHSA, supra note 19 at 31–32.  Thus
the use of heroin can have a “priming” for additional use.  The use
of heroin, even a small amount, can effect a release of endorphins
(which produce feelings of pleasure), which in turn increase the
desire for more heroin, which in turn produce more release of
endorphins.   Addiction research has found “that opiates can have
an effect equal to that of having an appetizer before dinner. A
small dose of a substance that effects the opiate receptor sites can
increase the drive to consume more of the same.”  The first inges-
tion of the heroin increases the motivation to have another.
Alfred Turner, Naltrexone: The Magic Bullet for Alcoholism (1995),
available at www.enteract.com/~alturner/neltrexo.html.  “This
appetizer or priming effect provides good reason to look at opiate
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Treatment Type and of Methadone Maintenance Dosage, 52 DRUG &
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Recidivism Among Opioid Addicts After Drug Treatment: An Analysis
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drug abuse, and drug use after the
first ingestion of naltrexone.  
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
The majority of SNAP partici-
pants were single-male African-
Americans. The median age of
SNAP participants was 31 years
old.  Almost all of the participants
had prior drug histories.  The
majority, 81%, began drug use before the age of 18.  The main
two introduction drugs were alcohol and marijuana.  More
than 70% of SNAP participants used at least one of these drugs
as the first drug in their drug use histories.  The median age for
first drug use was 15, and 14 years old was the mode.
The majority of SNAP patients did not test positive for
drugs while in the program. More than 75% of the participants
remained drug free.  But there was not a corresponding result
in successful treatment by SNAP participants.  The majority of
SNAP participants did not successfully complete the program.
While the majority of participants did not use drugs, only 13%
successfully completed the treatment.  These results may sug-
gest that drug treatment success may not be related to remain-
ing drug free during treatment.  The majority of participants
who entered the SNAP program did so unemployed (52%).  At
time of discharge, the majority of participants were employed
(57.5%).  
Previous drug treatment histories did not provide an
increased chance of successful completion in the SNAP pro-
gram.  Of the 71 SNAP participants who had prior drug treat-
ment histories, 84.5% failed to successfully complete treatment.
As would be expected, the longer participants remained in the
program the higher the rate of program success.  Out of the ten
participants who succeeded in treatment, nine remained in the
program longer than six months.  Conversely, 60.7% of those
who failed to complete treatment remained in the program less
than six months.  The median length of time SNAP participants
remained in the program was almost five months.  
Being married did not prove to be a positive factor in suc-
cessful treatment.  Participants who were married and success-
fully completed treatment accounted for only 6.7% of the mar-
ried SNAP population. Those participants who were single and
successfully completed treatment accounted for 15.8% of the
single SNAP population.  Those who were married and failed to
complete treatment accounted for 93.3% of the married SNAP
population.  Those participants who were single and failed to
complete treatment accounted for 80.7% of the single SNAP
population. Thus, a higher percentage of those who were single
successfully completed treatment than those who were married,
and a higher percentage of those who failed treatment were mar-
ried than those who failed and were single. The data may sug-
gest that there may be an inverse relationship between success-
ful completion and being married.  An alternative theory could
be that these married addicts had unstable marriages or were
married to addicts.  If so, these negative relationships could be
decreasing the opportunity for the SNAP participants to take
advantage of the program and successfully complete treatment.
Being employed was associated with program success.  Those
participants who were employed and successfully completed
treatment accounted for 21% of the employed SNAP population.
Those participants who were unemployed and successfully
completed treatment accounted for 3.4% of the total unem-
ployed SNAP population. Those who were employed and failed
to successfully complete treatment accounted for 76% of the
employed SNAP population. Those participants who were
unemployed and failed to complete treatment accounted for
93% of the unemployed SNAP population.  Thus, a higher per-
centage of those who were employed successfully completed
treatment than those who were unemployed, and a higher per-
centage of those who failed treatment were unemployed than
those who failed and were employed.
The majority of the SNAP patients started to use drugs in
their early teen years.  Longer periods spent using drugs were
associated with failure to complete treatment successfully.  
The SNAP program achieved a 75% negative test for drug use
and 13.7% treatment success rate.   A review of the literature
shows that success rates in naltrexone treatment programs for
heroin addicts can range from 12% to 20%.38 For example,
O’Brien and Greenstein39 note in their study that only 12% of
those who began treatment remained in the program beyond six
months.  In a study conducted by Tennant and his colleagues,
only 16% of the program participants completed the program
successfully. D’Ippoliti and his colleagues conducted a study on
treatment retention in Italy and found that after one year, the
retention rate among 1,503 heroin users using naltrexone was
18%.40 Some of the results of the SNAP program showed better
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41. Robert Greenstein et al., supra note 24 at 677.  See also, Robert
Greenstein et al., supra note 38 at 27.  See supra note 31 to the
contrary.
42. See, Jonathan Rabinowitz, et al., Compliance to Naltrexone
Treatment After Ultra-Rapid Opiate Detoxification: An Open Label
Naturalistic Study, 47 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE, Aug. 1997,
at 77; Domingos Neto et al., Sequential Combined Treatment of
Heroin Addicted Patients in Portugal with Naltrexone and Family
Therapy, 3 EUR. ADDICTION RES., July 1997, at 138; Philip Robson
& Margaret Bruce, A Comparison of “Visible” and “Invisible” Users
of Amphetamine, Cocaine and Heroin: Two Distinct Populations, 92
ADDICTION, 1729 (1997); Michael Gossop et al., Severity of
Dependence and Route of Administration of Heroin, Cocaine and
Amphetamines, 87 BRIT. J. ADDICTION, 1527 (1992); and Arnold
Washton et al., Successful Use of Naltrexone in Addicted Physicians
and Business Executives, 4 ADVANCES IN ALCOHOL AND SUBSTANCE
ABUSE 89 (1984).  See also, infra note 41.  For the assertion that
there is a distinction between compulsive/addictive users of
heroin and nonaddictive, long-term moderate users of heroin see,
Wayne M. Harding, Controlled Opiate Use: Fact or Artifact?, 3
ADVANCES IN ALCOHOL & SUBSTANCE ABUSE, Fall-Winter 1983, at
105.
43. See, Augusta Roth et al., Naltrexone Plus Group Therapy for
Treatment of Opiate-Abusing Health Care Professionals, 14 J.
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, 19 (1997); Walter Ling & Donald
Wesson, Naltrexone Treatment for Addicted Health Care
Professionals: A Collaborative Private Practice Experience, 9 J.
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, Sept. 1984, at 46; Arnold Washton et al.,
Naltrexone in Addicted Business Executives and Physicians, 9 J.
CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY, Sept. 1984, at 39; John Gonzalez & Rex
Brogden, Naltrexone: A Review of Its Pharmacodynamic and
Pharmacokinetic Properties and Therapeutic Efficacy in the
Management of Opioid Dependence, 35 DRUGS, Mar. 1988, at 192;
Richard Resnick et al., supra note 23.  See also, OFF. NAT’L DRUG
CONTROL POLICY, WHITE PAPER: TREATMENT PROTOCOL
EFFECTIVENESS STUDY (1996); A. Thomas McLellan, Patient
Characteristics Associated with Outcome, in RESEARCH ON
TREATMENT OF NARCOTIC ADDICTION 500 (James Cooper ed., 1983).  
44. See, Richard Resnick et al., supra note 25. See also, Richard
Resnick et al., A Cyclazocine Typology in Opiate Dependence, 126
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY, 1256; Richard Resnick & Arnold Washton,
Clinical Outcome with Naltrexone: Predictor Variables and Follow-
up Status in Detoxified Heroin Addicts, 311 ANNALS NEW YORK
ACAD. SCI., 241 (1978).
results than some of the work in the literature.  The research
literature suggests that patients in a naltrexone program will
“test naltrexone’s opiate blockade at least once during treat-
ment.”41 The results of this program show that the patient on
naltrexone may not test the blocking effect of the drug.  The
large majority of patients, 75%, did not test positive for any
drugs during their participation in the program.  
The program achieved other measures of drug treatment
success noted in the literature, including employment status
change and post-program arrest history.  The majority of SNAP
program participants left the program employed, regardless of
their discharge status.  Those who were employed at time of
discharge had a higher rate of successful treatment than those
who were not employed.  Additionally, the percentage of those
who were employed and who failed the treatment program was
less than those who were unemployed and failed the treatment
program.  
Other observations about drug addiction in the literature
were confirmed, specifically that “softer” drugs serve as an
introduction to “harder” drugs and that drug use starts in the
early years of adolescence.   Alcohol and marijuana proved to
be the two introduction drugs to the SNAP patients.  Heroin
proved to be a distant third.  Drug use of SNAP participants
began in their teen years.  A majority of the SNAP patients
were between 13 and 18 when they first began using drugs.
These results support the general belief that drug use begins in
the early years of the addict’s life, and if a person can remain
drug free through these early years the chances of becoming an
addict decrease.  
POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR THE JUDICIARY 
ON THE DESIGN AND UTILITY OF DRUG 
TREATMENT PROGRAMS
I. The judiciary should assess what type of addict is
before the bench before ordering the addict to a
drug treatment program.
If the case involves a
non-professional, high-
addiction-level, street
addict, the likelihood of
successful completion
ranges between a low of
12% to a high of 20%.
The court should review
the type of drug treat-
ment programs that are
available and make sure
that the program is designed to handle the type of
addict the court is dealing with.
There are different types of heroin addicts with dif-
ferent expectancy rates of successful treatment com-
pletion.42 Treatment programs are more successful
with addicts who have a stable family structure; are
married to a nonaddicted mate; are highly motivated to
stop using heroin; have good jobs; have minimal anti-
social behavior; have low drug craving/addiction; or
have high professional, social, or economic status.43
Programs with addicts who use heroin as a “self-med-
ication” have a higher rate of program discontinuation
or failure.44
II. Assessment of success of drug treatment programs
should be made using multiple measures, including
abstinence rates, improvement in employment sta-
tus, success in therapy treatment, reaching of social
goals, positive behavior changes, and the level of
involvement in criminal activity, rather than on
retention rates alone. The court should not assume
that failure to complete the program is analogous to
failure.
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45. George DeLeon & Nancy Jainchill, Circumstances, Motivation,
Readiness and Suitability as Correlates of Treatment Tenure, 18 J.
PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS, 203 (1986). 
It has been asserted that treatment programs are destined for
failure because they don’t consider the multifaceted factors of why
the treatment is being offered, the difference between treatment
and therapy, why an addict is seeking treatment, who is offering
the treatment, and why the addict has an addiction.  Additionally,
the lack of specific and meaningful goal setting for the individual
addict, the lack of specific diagnosis of the individual addict, the
confusion of goals to help the addict become an effective patient
with goals to make the patient a better citizen by improving his or
her lifestyle, and confusing different theories of therapy and treat-
ment modalities all help to create program design problems that
lead to failure.  See, Stanley Einstein, Factors Initiating/Affecting
the Treatment of Drug Use and the Drug User, 15 INT’L J. ADDICTIONS
773 (1980).
46. Nachman Ben-Yehuda, Success and Failure in Rehabilitation: The
Case of Methadone Maintenance, 9 AM. J. COMMUNITY PSYCHOL., 83
(1981).  It has also been observed that since treatment programs
generally are not evaluated using random selection of patients
and control groups and established baseline measurements and
have reliability and validity limitations, the fact of high attrition
rates should not be the sole assessment of success.  William Berg,
Evaluation of Community-Based Drug Abuse Treatment Programs: A
Review of the Literature, in THE ADDICTIVE PROCESS: EFFECTIVE
SOCIAL WORK APPROACHES 81 (E. Freeman ed., 1992). 
47. William Berg, supra note 46 at 84.
48. Id.
48. Nachman Ben-Yehuda, supra note 46 at 85.
50. Id. at 86.
51. George DeLeon & Nancy Jainchill, supra note 45.  For two theo-
ries on the readiness to change and its impact on behavior change
see, James Prochaska et al., The Transtheoretical Model of Behavior
Change, in THE HANDBOOK OF HEALTH BEHAVIOR CHANGE 59 (Sally
Shumaker et al. ed., 2nd ed., 1998), and Neil Grunberg et al.,
Biological Obstacles to Adoption and Maintenance of Health-
Promoting Behaviors, in THE HANDBOOK OF HEALTH BEHAVIOR
CHANGE 269 (Sally Shumaker et al. ed., 2nd ed., 1998). 
52. Nachman Ben-Yehuda, supra note 46.  The future-oriented indi-
vidual looks to the future and makes plans to make his or her life
better in the future.  Decisions are meant to generate change as
supposed to a past-oriented person who lives from moment to
moment, who is resistant to change or unwilling to take account
of behavior and make decisions that produce benefits in the
future. Id. at 88, 97.  “Future-oriented patients apparently benefit
most from their therapeutic experience in [drug treatment] pro-
grams.” Id. at 97.  This classification as either past or future ori-
ented can be helpful in the designing and the selection of clients
for a potential drug treatment program.  “Upon admission . . .
patients could be classified . . . as to the behavior expected of
them while [in] the program.  This information could potentially
help clinical and administrative personnel working with drug-
abuse to better deal with their patients, construct differential
treatment plans for them, and assess success more meaningfully.”
Id. at 97.
53. George DeLeon & Nancy Jainchill, supra note 45. A positive moti-
vation is “ a desire to forge a new lifestyle; a belief that one can be
successful and have the good things in life; or a desire for per-
sonal growth, to be a better person . . . as well as to have health-
ier relationships.” Id. at 203.
54. James Prochaska et al., supra note 51.  In the preparation stage
“people are intending to take action in the immediate future, usu-
ally measured as during the next month.  These individuals have
a plan of action. . . . These are the people we should recruit for
. . . action-oriented programs.” Id at 61.
High dropout rates are “the
rule for all drug treatment
modalities as for treatment of
other psychological prob-
lems.”45 While the “retention
rate” has been the most used
and widespread criterion for
success, this criterion alone is
unreliable for assessing the
success of a treatment pro-
gram or the individual client
in treatment because it does
not take into account changes
in the behavior and lifestyle of
the individual.46
One of the limitations to
the retention rate criteria is
that it does not take into
account the factor of self-
selection.47 Use of retention
rates as a determination of
success is vulnerable to selection bias because those who suc-
cessfully stay in a treatment program do so because the pro-
gram expels them or they choose to remain in the program.
Thus, the “success” or “failure” of the program based on reten-
tion is artificially inflated or deflated by those who are removed
from the program either by the participants’ choice or by the
program.  Selection bias produces an outcome, i.e., success or
failure that can be explained as function of individual differ-
ences among the patients and not the treatment program.
Although, the “single most important predictor of success
[is] the length of stay in treatment,”48 “the so-called retention
rate . . . simply measures the length of time an addict stays in
a program,”49 not the change in the addict due to the program.
It has also been noted that retention rates can be associated
with factors outside of the program, including environmental
support for drug addiction, personality characteristics of the
addict, employment status, status and health of the addicts’
family, psychological status of the addict, criminal history,50
the readiness of the addict to change,51 and multiple drug use
history.  
III. Research shows that more than 80% of the clients
in a drug treatment program drop out from the pro-
gram during a first attempt at drug treatment.  The
court should determine if the addict is at a point in
his or her addiction that allows for successful
treatment.
Research on program treatment dropouts as well as theory
on behavior change notes that treatment programs work with
patients who are future oriented,52 have a positive motivation
to change,53 and are at a stage in their addiction when prepa-
ration for change54 is achieved.  The future-oriented addict has
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55. Peggy el-Mallakh, Treatment Models for Clients with Co-Occurring
Addictive and Mental Disorders, 12 ARCHIVES PSYCHIATRIC NURSING,
Apr. 1998, at 71.
56. Id.
57. H. Lawrence Ross et al., Retention in Substance Abuse Treatment:
Role of Psychiatric Symptom Severity, 6 AM. J. ADDICTION 293
(1997).
58. Jennifer Tidey et al., Psychiatric Symptom Severity in Cocaine-
Dependent Outpatients: Demographics, Drug Use Characteristics
and Treatment Outcome, 50 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE, Mar.
1998, at 9. 
59. Joan Russo et al., Psychiatric Status, Quality of Life, and Level of
Care as Predictors of Outcomes of Acute Inpatient Treatment, 48
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICE 1427 (1997).  For research on addressing the
emotional and spiritual factors that can affect heroin treatment
success or failure see Karen Miotto et al., Overdose, Suicide
Attempts and Death Among a Cohort of Naltrexone-Treated Opioid
Addicts, 45 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE Apr. 1997, at 131, and
Leslie Green, et al., Stories of Spiritual Awakening: The Nature of
Spirituality in Recovery, 15 J. SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT, 325.
60. Rao Rapaka & Heinz Sorer, Introduction, in DISCOVERY OF NOVEL
OPIOID MEDICATIONS (Nat’l. Inst. on Drug Abuse Res. Monograph
decided to make a change and end his or her addiction.  The
addict is positively motivated because the change is self-
desired—the addict wants a better life.  The addict is prepared
to change and demonstrates this preparation by the formation
of a plan to end the addiction.  The addict enters the program
having decided to enter a treatment program with the desire
and expectation to successfully complete it, as compared to
entering the program to avoid incarceration. 
If the program is servicing addicts who have not reached the
point of having a future-oriented, positively motivated, pre-
pared mental state to make a change in their lives (i.e., end
their heroin addiction) success rates will be low regardless of
the value of the program. 
IV. The presence of psychological dysfunction on
potential clients can affect retention and successful
completion rates.   The court should determine
whether the treatment modality can accommodate
clients who have psychological problems.
Treatment programs need to be designed to address
the individual addict and quality-of-life issues that
the addict is experiencing, along with the addiction
to the drug itself.  
Many of those who enter drug treatment programs have
moderate to severe mental illness.55 More significant is the fact
that only about half of those addicts who have a mental illness
receive treatment for the mental illness and the drug addiction
together.56 The presence of mental illness and dropout rates
have been shown to be associated.57 Research has also found
that mental illness can affect the ability to function and how
drugs impact the individual.58 Programs that address both drug
addiction and mental illness should design treatment modali-
ties to take into account the importance of the client’s quality of
life. Recent research has noted that the patients’ quality of life
(family support, employment, positive self-image, etc.) can pre-
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dict successful treatment indepen-
dent of other factors, including the
psychiatric status of the client.59
V. Drug addiction is not a prob-
lem in which the addiction
to a specific drug is the only
focus of attention.  Drug
addiction is usually one
member of a family of issues
within the life of the addict. 
The nature of addiction has been described as a state in
which the addict (1) has a persistent regular use of a drug; (2)
attempts to stop such use leads to significant and painful with-
drawal symptoms; (3) continues to use the addictive drug
despite damaging physical or psychological problems, or both;
(4) engages in compulsive drug-seeking behavior; and (5)
needs a constant increasing level of dosage of the drug to get
“high.”60
Treatment programs should implement program modalities
in the light of recent research that has observed that (1) drug
use occurs within a broader family of social and psychological
problems, (2) cognitive-behavioral abilities are fundamentally
psychological in nature, (3) the motivation to change is a cog-
nitive-behavioral process, and (4) the skills and the relation-
ship between the client and the individual counselor has an
impact on final outcome.61
VI. The court should consider if the drug treatment pro-
gram design encompasses the biochemical as well as
the cognitive-behavioral aspects of addiction when
designing drug addiction treatment modalities. 
Virtually “all drugs . . . have common effects, either directly
or indirectly, on a single pathway deep within the brain.”62 In
# 147) (Roa Rapaka & Heinz Sorer eds., 1995), at v. 
61. William Miller & Sandra Brown, Why Psychologists Should Treat
Alcohol and Drug Problems, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 1269 (1997).  James
Inciardi explains:
drug abuse as overdetermined behavior.  That is, physical
dependence is secondary to the wide range of influences
that instigate and regulate drug-taking and drug seeking
behaviors.  In the vast majority of drug offenders, there are
cognitive problems; psychological dysfunction is common;
thinking may be unrealistic or disorganized; values are mis-
shapen, and frequently, there are deficits in education and
employment skills.  [D]rug use is a response to a series of
social and psychological disturbances.
James Inciardi, “Drug Treatment in Prisons,” presentation at the
Summit on U.S. Drug Policy, U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on the Judiciary, Washington, D.C. (May 7, 1993), at
3–4.  See also, Robert Hooper et al., Treatment Techniques in
Corrections-Based Therapeutic Communities, 73 PRISON J.,
Sept./Dec., 1993, at 290.
62. Alan Leshner, Addiction Is a Brain Disease, and It Matters, 278
SCIENCE, Oct. 1997, at 45, 46.
Many of those
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drug treatment 
programs have
moderate to
severe mental
illness.
63. See, supra notes 21, 31–33.
64. SHAMSHA, supra note 21 at 27.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 28.  See also, Robert Swift, Medications and Alcohol Craving,
23 ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH: J. NAT’L. INST. ALCOHOL ABUSE &
ALCOHOLISM, 207 (1999). See also infra notes 69 and 71 for stud-
ies dealing with craving and the biochemical dynamics of drug
addiction.
68. SHAMSHA, supra note 21 at 27.  See also, infra notes 69 and 71.
69. See Neuroscience:  Pathways of Addiction, 21 ALCOHOL HEALTH &
RES. WORLD: J. NAT’L INST. ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM (1997)
for a series of articles on the biochemistry of addiction. 
70. See, supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text.  
71. For general discussion on craving and drug use see, Raymond
Anton, What Is Craving? Models and Implication for Treatment, 23
ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD: J. NAT’L INST. ALCOHOL ABUSE &
ALCOHOLISM, 165 (1999); Stephen Tiffany, Cognitive Concepts of
Craving, 23 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD: J. NAT’L INST.
ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM, 215 (1999); and Mary Jo Breiner
et al., Approaching Avoidance: A Step Essential to the Understanding
of Craving, 23 ALCOHOL HEALTH & RES. WORLD: J. NAT’L INST.
ALCOHOL ABUSE & ALCOHOLISM 197 (1999).
regard to the effect of heroin on
the brain, research has found that
heroin focuses on the opioid
receptors of the brain.  As previ-
ously noted63 the pleasure from
opiates “can be more powerfully
rewarding than that produced by
natural reinforcers.”64 This
assessment is significant in the
study of how and why drug
addiction is developed and main-
tained through positive and neg-
ative reinforcement.
In studies dealing with positive and negative reinforcement,
it is believed that if pleasure responses can be secured artifi-
cially a person will choose the artificial stimulation even over
natural positive stimulation such as food or sex.
[The] process in which a pleasure-inducing
action becomes repetitive is called positive rein-
forcement. Conversely, abrupt discontinuation of
alcohol, opiates, and other psychoactive drugs fol-
lowing chronic use . . . results in discomfort and
craving. The motivation to use a substance in order
to avoid discomfort is called negative reinforcement.
Positive reinforcement is believed to be controlled
by various neurotransmitter systems, whereas nega-
tive reinforcement is believed to be the result of
adaptations produced by chronic use within the
same neurotransmitter systems.65
The use of heroin creates both positive and negative rein-
forcement through its processing within the brain.  The heroin
acts as an exogenous opiate within the brain and acts as a neu-
rotransmitter for pleasure within the brain.  The heroin pro-
duces a stronger pleasure reaction than endogenous opioids
(endorphins and enkephalins). 
The chronic use of exogenous opiates within the pleasure-
seeking system drives the need for the exogenous opiates, and
the opioid receptors are now only stimulated by the exogenous
opiates, rather than by natural pleasure stimuli.  “Natural rein-
forcers such as food, drink, and sex [which] activate [pleasure]
pathways in the brain [are replaced by the exogenous opiates]
as surrogates of the natural reinforcers.”66 It is also believed
that the use of these opiates and the negative reinforcement
they produce (the need for the opiates to avoid pain due to
lack of presence of the opiate) are aided by other natural
occurring neurotransmitters in the brain, such as dopamine
and serotonin.  Dopamine produces immediate feelings of
pleasure and elation that reinforce certain behaviors, such as
eating or sex, and motivates repetition of these activities.67
Dopamine is believed to be produced with the use of opiates.
“Serotonin is associated with the reinforcing effects of many
abused drugs through its mood regulating and anxiety reduc-
ing effects.  Low levels of serotonin are associated with depres-
sion and anxiety.”68 The lack of stimulation by opioid recep-
tors is believed to be a cause for low levels of dopamine and
serotonin. The lack of these two chemicals is thought to pro-
duce depression, which in turn produces the craving for the
heroin to relieve feelings of depression and to restore feeling
pleasure or at least feeling “normal.”
The cycle of addiction and compulsive and impulsive drug
use is compounded by biochemical change within the brain69
and cognitive-behavioral cues.  The cycle of addiction is
started by positive reinforcement and then driven by negative
reinforcement.  Heroin produces a strong pleasure effect, and
cognitively, the user decides to use the drug again to receive
the same pleasurable effect.  The opioid receptors of the brain
become addicted to the presence of the heroin and then require
the heroin stimulation continuously.  Here is where negative
reinforcement takes control.  The user no longer takes the
heroin to feel pleasure, but to feel “normal.”  The purpose in
taking the heroin is to avoid painful sensations not to enjoy
pleasurable sensations.  During drug treatment the addict will
desire to take heroin on two levels.  Impulsive use will occur
due to cues in the environment or by memories of taking the
drug.  The addict takes the drug almost without thinking about
the consequences.  Compulsive (craving) drug use occurs due
to the addict obsessing over the pleasure gained by the drug.
The addict thinks about the drug, and the thoughts drive the
addicts to relapse.  
The use of naltrexone addresses the results of heroin use
due to impulsive and compulsive behavior.70 But the issue
treatment programs need to contend with is the cognitive
behavior of addicts in that they decide that life without heroin
is not desirable and simply choose to stop taking the naltrex-
one so that they can enjoy the pleasure of the heroin.  The
treatment therapy must create new cognitive pathways within
the brain to allow for controlling the cravings71 for the heroin
and new behavior patterns to deal with the social factors of
their lives.  Since human beings have the ability to cognitively
choose to do or not do something, drug treatment programs
need to focus on how the individual addict handles life stres-
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72. Alan Leshner, supra note 62 at 46. See also, George Koob et al.,
Neuroscience of Addiction, 21 NEURON 467 (1998).  Some recent
research has asserted that addiction can be traced to genetics, see
Thomas Kosten, Addiction as a Brain Disease, 155 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 711 (1997).
73. Alan Leshner, supra note 62 at 46.
74. Charles O’Brien, Progress in the Science of Addiction, 154 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 1195, 1195 (1997).  O’Brien asserted that
Drug exposures . . . paired with environmental cues (per-
sons, places, things) . . . acquire the ability to activate the
same or complementary brain circuits even in the absence
of the drug.  Id. Drug-related cues alone have [been shown
to produce] increases in limbic blood flow in formerly
dependent cocaine users . . . . Drug cues have also produced
increases in the metabolism of specific brain areas. Id. at
1196. 
This explains why addiction is considered to be a chronic disease.
Although the use of drugs has ended, pathways and brain chem-
istry have been altered so as to produce the effects of the “disease”
although the agent causing the disease is no longer present.
Although this chemical analysis may be true, the choice of
whether to indulge in an impulse or compulsive need (chemically
created or not) is not destroyed. One still chooses to indulge a
desire and one chooses to frequent an area that provides those
cues of addiction.  
75. Aviel Goodman, Science of Addiction (Letter to the Editor), 155
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1642, 1642 (1998).  Goodman goes on to say
the following:
I would describe addiction as a chronic condition that
develops through a process that involves complex interac-
tions over time between genetic and environmental factors.
More specifically, I would propose that two sets of determi-
nants are involved in the development of an addictive dis-
order: 1) those that concern underlying neurobiological
abnormalities that are shared by all addictive disorders and
2) those that relate to the selection of a particular substance
as the one that is preferred for addictive use. I would add
that each set includes both genetic and environmental fac-
tors. Environmental factors in the development of the
underlying neurobiological abnormalities include deficien-
cies in the child’s caregiving environment during the first
years of life, when the maturing brain is most sensitive to
external influences and depends on particular qualities of
interchange with the caregiving environment for healthy
development. Genetic factors in selection include geneti-
cally based variations in 1) the sensitivity of the reward sys-
tem to different substances, 2) the body’s sensitivity to
immediate aversive consequences of using a substance
(such as flushing or standing ataxia after ingestion of alco-
hol), and 3) the intensity of the individual’s sensitivity to
various painful effects [which are] associated with . . . neg-
ative reinforcement.  
See, Bruce Lawford et al., The D(2) Dopamine Receptor A (1) allele
and Opioid Dependence: Association with Heroin Use and Response
to Methadone Treatment, 96 AM. J. MED. GENETICS:
NEUROPSYCHIATRIC GENETICS 592 (2000), for research showing that
heroin addicts that have a certain type of dopamine receptor are
more likely to drop out or fail a methadone treatment program
than those without this variation. The research noted that there
were significantly more heroin addicts with this variation (TaqI
A(1) allele of the D(2) dopamine receptor) in a group of addicts
that had poor treatment outcomes compared to those who had
successful treatment outcomes.  The researchers also found that
19% of the heroin addicts had this variation compared to 4.6% of
a control group of people free from drug and alcohol use and free
from a family history of alcohol and drug use.
76. Gene Heyman, On the Science of Substance Abuse (Editorial), 278
SCIENCE, 15 (1997).
77. Id. at 15.
sors and train the addict to resort to socially positive alterna-
tives to reduce stress, rather than resort to the use of heroin. 
VII. The biochemical and cognitive-behavioral aspects
of drug addiction present the criminal justice sys-
tem with political as well as social policy issues.
The criminal justice system needs to contend with
the implications of the fact that drug addicts have
altered brain chemistry, while maintaining its
inherent purpose of focusing on individual
accountability and responsibility. Conversely, drug
treatment designers and drug addiction scientists
must contend with the fact that personal responsi-
bility and accountability will always be a demand
of policy makers and the public regardless of the
science of addiction.
Research on addiction shows that prolonged drug use
“causes pervasive changes in the brain [and] the addicted
brain is distinctly different from the non addicted brain” and
this fact leads to the conclusion that on a general policy level
“the addicted individual must be dealt with as if he or she is in
a different brain state.”72 In other words, treat drug addicts as
those whose minds have been “altered fundamentally by
drugs.”73 Although the literature is settled on the fact that
addiction causes changes in the
brain, there is some debate on the
cause of addiction.  For example,
O’Brien defined addiction as acts
of  “a chronic disease produced
by thousands of exposures to
drugs.  Each drug taking episode
activates specific brain struc-
tures, leaving a memory trace
that persists long after the drug
has disappeared from the body.”74
Goodman explains that addiction
is not formed by repeated use of a
drug, but develops through a
combination of environmental
and genetic characteristics.75
Heyman, while agreeing, “changes in brain function alter
voluntary behavior,” notes that addiction is still a behavior of
which social and economic costs can persuade addicts to end
their addiction.76 Heyman asserts that there are two types of
addicts, those who take drugs voluntarily and those who do so
involuntarily.  The former can be persuaded cognitively but the
latter will “not be persuaded by costs and incentives to stop
using them.”77 O’Brien asserts that three factors should be
kept in mind when considering addiction and how to deal with
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See Goodman, supra note 75.
79. Alan Leshner, supra note 62 at 45.
80. See, Carole Gresenz et al., Supplemental Security Income (SSI),
Disability Insurance (DI) and Substance Abusers, 34 COMMUNITY
MENTAL HEALTH J. 337 (1998).
81. For studies on long-term affects of heroin use see, Yih-Ing Hser et
al., A 33-Year Follow-Up of Narcotics Addicts, 58 ARCHIVES GEN.
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addicts:  (1) the availability of
the drug and its cost and purity;
(2) the genetic predisposition
of the addict; and (3) the
applicable social and environ-
mental pressures on the addict
to continue or stop drug use.78
Although neuroscientists are
convinced that addiction is a
biological issue involving brain
damage, “the more common
view is that drug addicts are
weak . . . unwilling to lead
moral lives and to control their
behavior and gratifications.”79
Although the point of drug
addiction and personal respon-
sibility for addiction has been
belittled in some of the litera-
ture, there is value in the com-
mon belief that human beings think and thus can control their
behavior.  The ability to be responsible for an addiction accom-
panies the power to end addiction.  The mere fact that one has
damaged his or her brain and formed neuropathways for cer-
tain stimuli does not mean that the ability to choose has been
destroyed.  The fact that human beings have the ability to
think, learn (form new neuropathways), and choose between
behaviors seems to be acknowledged as an afterthought by
some of the literature on addiction.  The political (used here to
mean philosophical) view that behavior is a cognitively con-
trolled activity that is at least equal in the cause and mainte-
nance of addictive behavior needs to be considered by treat-
ment program designers and neuroscientists.  Those who make
political policy may not be aware or care about the science of
addiction, especially if the idea of personal responsibility is not
reflected in theories of addiction.  For example, Congress has
recently restricted social security payments and other social
benefits from those who have drug addictions.80 Similarly, the
judiciary should make sure that a proposed drug treatment
program modality includes personal responsibility and behav-
ior modification as one of the tools to address drug addiction.
Both the science of addiction and personal responsibility
add to the understanding of addiction and addiction treatment.
Moral responsibility aside, drug addiction brings serious and
chronic physical and social consequences.81 As noted by
Heyman, three factors should be kept in mind when trying to
understand addiction: “[1] drug use in addicts can be altered
by the proper arrangements of costs and benefits, [2] addictive
drugs reduce options but do not eliminate choice, and [3] the
biology of addiction is the biology of voluntary behavior.”82
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The Fourth Amendment of the UnitedStates Constitution protects the rightof the people against unreasonable
searches and seizures by requiring a prob-
able cause showing in order to obtain a
warrant before conducting such searches.1
Since the United States Supreme Court
decided Terry v. Ohio2 in 1968, however,
the words of the Fourth Amendment have
been questioned and the rights of the
individual challenged.  When the Court
decided Illinois v. Wardlow3 in 2000, it was
made clear that the words once written to
protect all Americans do not pertain to
those residing in locations deemed “high-
crime areas.”4
In Terry, the Supreme Court held that
law enforcement officials could stop and
frisk an individual, without probable
cause, if there was a reasonable suspicion
that the individual is involved in criminal
activity.5 During the next 25 years, many
cases fleshed out Terry’s rules, gradually
requiring less and less evidence for a stop
and frisk.6 Most recently, the Supreme
Court expanded Terry to include justify-
ing a stop and frisk of those located in
high-crime areas who take flight upon
seeing the police in Illinois v. Wardlow.7
In Wardlow, two officers were patrolling
an area known for heavy narcotics traf-
ficking.8 The officers stopped and frisked
a man who took flight upon seeing them.9
They discovered a .38 caliber handgun
and arrested the man.10
The Illinois trial court held that the
gun was recovered during a lawful stop
and frisk.11 The Illinois Court of Appeals
reversed, concluding that the officers did
not have enough supporting evidence to
show that the location of the stop and
frisk was a high-crime area; thus, the offi-
cers lacked grounds for reasonable suspi-
cion.12 The Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed, but rejected the intermediate
appellate court’s reasoning and found that
sudden flight in a location deemed a high-
crime area by police is insufficient to cre-
ate reasonable suspicion.13
The United States Supreme Court
reversed.14 The Court found that while
headlong flight is not indicative of wrong-
doing it is certainly suggestive of such.15
The Court held that Wardlow’s presence
in a high-crime area and unprovoked
flight justifiably led police to believe that
he was involved in criminal activity.16
This article first progressively examines
how the Supreme Court has developed
exceptions and limitations to Fourth
Amendment protection.  Next, it analyzes
the reasoning of the majority and dissent-
ing opinions in Illinois v. Wardlow.  Finally,
it analyzes the effect that Wardlow will have
on future Fourth Amendment cases and
concludes that this decision grants the
state more power to protect its citizens at
the cost of subjecting low-income, primar-
ily minority, Americans to disproportion-
ately higher instances of personal invasion.  
THE STEADY PROGRESSION OF 
STATE DOMINANCE OVER
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Reasonable Suspicion Replaces
Probable Cause
The Supreme Court broke new ground
when deciding Terry v. Ohio.  For the first
time, questions referring to the restric-
tions placed on law enforcement officials
to conduct legal searches and seizures
were being raised.  Law enforcement was
looking to the Court for a little latitude in
the “probable cause” requirement of the
Fourth Amendment.  Their argument was
that this would allow them to better fulfill
their duties and obligations to the public,
while protecting themselves from unnec-
essary risks; the cost being a relatively
slight intrusion on the individual.17 The
Court agreed and held it constitutional to
perform a “stop and frisk” with less than
probable cause.18
In Terry, a plainclothes officer was
walking his usual beat when he observed
two men standing on a corner.19 After
watching the men for some time, their
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17. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 10, 12.
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conduct suggested they were planning to
rob a nearby jewelry store.20 The officer
approached the men, identified himself as
a police officer and asked for their
names.21 When they “mumbled some-
thing” in response to his inquires, the offi-
cer patted down the outside of the defen-
dant’s clothing and discovered a pistol in
the breast pocket of his overcoat.22
The Supreme Court found that the offi-
cer’s stopping of the men was a “seizure”
under the Fourth Amendment and that
the officer had acted without probable
cause.23 The Court then weighed these
factors against the state’s interests of crime
prevention and protection of its police
officers.24 Upon evaluation, the Court
held that there must be a narrowly drawn
authority to permit a reasonable search for
weapons for the protection of the police
officer when he has reason to believe that
he is dealing with an armed and danger-
ous individual, regardless of whether he
has probable cause to arrest the individual
for a crime.25
To create the balance that needed to be
struck in this type of case, the Court
formed a two-part test.26 First, the officer
must be able to point to specific and artic-
ulable facts that, taken together with ratio-
nal inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant the intrusion.27 Due weight must
be given, not to the officer’s inchoate and
unparticularized suspicion or “hunch,”
but to the specific reasonable inferences
that he is entitled to draw from the facts in
light of his experience.28 Second, the sus-
pect must be believed to be armed and
dangerous and the frisk must be limited to
that which is necessary for the discovery of
weapons that might be used to harm the
officer or others nearby.29
Terry gave police the power to stop and
frisk civilians when they reasonably
believe criminal activity is afoot during
street encounters, but limited that power
by excluding an officer’s unsubstantiated
suspicion.   What the Court did not do
was to explain what the boundaries were
concerning reasonable suspicion and
hunches.  What did the Court believe the
proper balance was between a precaution-
ary frisk for police protection and an
unjustifiable intrusion into an individual’s
privacy?  Four years after Terry, this issue
presented itself in Adams v. Williams,30
when the Supreme Court was asked if rea-
sonable suspicion could be inferred from
a tip received by an informant and not
from actual events witnessed by the offi-
cer himself.31
In Adams, an officer was patrolling a
high-crime area when an informant told
him that an individual seated in a nearby
car was in possession of a gun and nar-
cotics.32 Acting on this tip, the officer
approached the parked car and asked the
man inside to step out.33 When the sus-
pect opted to roll down the window
instead, the officer reached into the car
and removed a fully loaded revolver from
the man’s waistband, precisely the place
indicated by the informant.34
The Supreme Court agreed with the
state and found that reasonable cause can
be based on information supplied by
another person.35 The Court held that in
instances when a credible informant
warns of a specific impending crime it is
justifiable that the officer act on his tip
and conduct a further investigation.36
The decisions in Terry and Adams gave
the lower courts a reference point to look
to when deciding whether to suppress evi-
dence produced from a stop and frisk.
From Terry, it was understood that a
police officer might stop and frisk an indi-
vidual with a reasonable suspicion that the
person was involved in criminal activity.  It
was also understood that officers were
expected to use their experience to draw
rational inferences that would then lead to
reasonable suspicion.  Adams supple-
mented Terry by allowing a tip received
from an informant to be used to create a
reasonable suspicion.  However the lower
courts still did not know at this point what
was not a sufficient basis for a Terry stop.
The Supreme Court got an opportunity to
answer this in United States v. Brignoni-
Ponce,37 and later in Brown v. Texas.38
A Look into What Is Not a Sufficient
Basis for Reasonable Suspicion
In Brignoni-Ponce, the issue before the
Supreme Court was whether to allow the
Border Patrol to stop vehicles solely
because the driver or occupants appeared
to be of Mexican descent.39 The Supreme
Court balanced the public interest served
by the prevention of illegal aliens with the
interference of individual liberty that
results when an officer stops an automo-
bile and questions its occupants.40 The
Court concluded that to allow patrol stops
of all vehicles, without any suspicion that
the vehicle is carrying illegal immigrants,
would subject the residents of these and
other areas to potentially unlimited inter-
ference with their use of highways, solely
at the discretion of Border Patrol offi-
cers.41
Winter 2002 - Court Review 37
20. Id.
21. Id. at 6-7.
22. Id. at 7.
23. Id. at 16, 20. The Court defined a “seizure” as whenever a police
officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away.  These seizures were then described as more than a “petty
indignity,” but a serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person,
which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong resentment.
Id. at 16.
24. Id. at 21-27.
25. Id. at 27.
26. Id. at 20-27.
27. Id. at 21.
28. Id. at 27.  
29. Id. at 26.
30. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
31. Id. at 144.
32. Id. at 144-45.
33. Id. at 145.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 147.
36. Id. at 146-47; see id. at 156-57 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting
that the only tip the informant had given the officer previously
pertained to alleged homosexual conduct in a local train station;
the officer used the tip to conduct a further investigation that
resulted neither in an arrest nor in any finding of substantiating
evidence).  
37. 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
38. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
39. 422 U.S. at 874.
40. Id. at 878-89.
41. Id. at 880, 882.
Although the Court held it unconsti-
tutional to allow the Border Patrol to stop
drivers strictly due to ethnicity, it did go
on to conclude that the likelihood that
any given person of Mexican ancestry is
an alien is high enough to make Mexican
appearance a relevant factor in determin-
ing reasonable suspicion.42 The Court
permitted trained officers to use this fac-
tor, along with others,43 to create rational
inferences that would lead to reasonable
suspicion.44
With this new limit set on Terry, the
Court would next have to decide whether
reasonable suspicion was created when an
individual was observed in a high-crime
area, in Brown v. Texas.  
In Brown, officers were patrolling an
area of El Paso with a high incidence of
drug traffic when they saw a man
unknown to them who looked suspi-
cious.45 The officers stopped and ques-
tioned the man.46 When he refused to
identify himself, the officers frisked and
arrested him, charging him with violating
a Texas statute that made it a criminal act
for a person to refuse to give his name and
address to an officer.47
The Supreme Court found that there
was no basis for suspecting Brown of any
misconduct.48 The fact that he was in a
neighborhood frequented by drug users,
standing alone, was not a basis for con-
cluding that he was himself engaged in
criminal conduct.49
In Brignoni-Ponce and Brown, the
Supreme Court began to set limits on
what could constitute a Terry stop.  No
longer could one’s ethnicity be the sole
cause for reasonable suspicion, nor could
one’s location in a high-crime area.  The
pendulum seemed to swing, although
slightly, back in the direction of protect-
ing an individual’s right to freedom from
police intrusions.  After Brown, though,
the pendulum began to swing back in
favor of law enforcement and protecting
the states’ interests in preventing crime,
beginning with United States v. Cortez50
and United States v. Sokolow.51
The Supreme Court Reinforces Its
Belief in Law Enforcement’s Ability
to Define Reasonable Suspicion 
Cortez concerned the stop of a vehi-
cle believed to be transporting illegal
aliens.52 In deciding Cortez, and to clarify
which factors constituted sufficient cause
for a Terry stop, the Court devised the
“whole picture” test.  Instead of making a
specific factor a per se rule of law in deter-
mining reasonable suspicion, all the cir-
cumstances and evidence are to be exam-
ined and weighed accordingly by law
enforcement officials.53 Although this
gave a great amount of power to officers
to determine inferences based on the evi-
dence they had weighed, the Court
believed this power was warranted since
some inferences and deductions can elude
an untrained person.54
In United States v. Sokolow, the Court
needed to determine whether the “whole
picture” test would include stopping an
individual at an airport for committing a
large cluster of innocent activities that
could also be associated with the trans-
porting of narcotics. 55 Sokolow involved
a nervous young man traveling under an
alias to a known drug-trafficking city,
Miami, who paid for his ticket with
$2,100 in cash.56 He did not check his
luggage and was traveling from Honolulu,
a 20-hour round-trip flight, to stay in
Miami for only 48 hours.57
The Court found that although any of
these factors by itself may not be proof of
illegal conduct, taken together they
amount to reasonable suspicion.58 Thus,
Sokolow reemphasizes the message that
lower courts should defer to law enforce-
ment and its collective knowledge and
experience in passing upon the propriety
of Terry stops.59
DOES LOCATION PLUS EVASION
EQUAL REASONABLE SUSPICION?  
State Courts Were Split
The Supreme Court previously deter-
mined in Brown v. Texas that an individ-
ual’s location in a high-crime area alone is
insufficient to provide reasonable suspi-
cion, but, until Wardlow, it had yet to hear
a case that involved whether evasion from
the police in a high-crime area would con-
stitute a Terry stop. State courts were split
three ways on deciding this issue.  Some
believed that evasion from police alone
was sufficient grounds for a Terry stop,60
for others an evasion from police in a
high-crime area was sufficient,61 but still
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others believed neither scenario was
acceptable.62 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Wardlow to clarify whether a
location-plus-evasion stop was constitu-
tional and set forth a bright-line rule. 
The Supreme Court Resolves the
Issue 
Officers Nolan and Harvey were work-
ing as uniformed officers in a special
operations section of the Chicago Police
Department.63 The officers were driving
the last car of a four-car caravan converg-
ing on an area known for heavy narcotics
trafficking.64
As the caravan passed a street, Officer
Nolan observed Wardlow standing next
to the building holding an opaque bag.65
Wardlow looked in the direction of the
officers and fled.66 The officers eventu-
ally cornered him on the street.67 Nolan
then exited the car and stopped
Wardlow.68 He immediately conducted a
protective patdown search for weapons
because in his experience it was common
for weapons to be found in the near
vicinity of narcotics transactions.69
Officer Nolan opened the bag and discov-
ered a .38 caliber handgun.70
The Illinois trial court denied
Wardlow’s motion to suppress, finding
the gun was recovered during a lawful
stop and frisk.71 The Illinois Court of
Appeals reversed, concluding that the
gun should have been suppressed
because Officer Nolan did not have rea-
sonable suspicion sufficient to justify a
Terry stop.72 The court found the evi-
dence presented by the state insufficient
to prove that Wardlow was found in a
high-crime area.73
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed,
but on a different basis than the interme-
diate appellate court.74 The Illinois
Supreme Court determined that sudden
flight in a high-crime area does not by
itself create a reasonable suspicion justi-
fying a Terry stop.75 The court concluded
that while police have a right to approach
individuals and ask questions, the indi-
vidual has no obligation to respond and
may simply go on his or her way.76 The
court then determined that flight may
simply be an exercise of this right to “go
on one’s way,” and thus, could not consti-
tute reasonable suspicion justifying a
Terry stop.77
The Supreme Court rejected this ratio-
nale and reversed.  The majority con-
cluded that flight, by its very nature, is
not “going about one’s business,” but is
just the opposite.78 The Court then reit-
erated its previous holdings, explaining
that an officer may conduct a brief intro-
ductory stop when an officer has a rea-
sonable, articulable suspicion that crimi-
nal activity is afoot.79 The determination
of reasonable suspicion is to be based on
commonsense judgments and inferences
about human behavior.80
The dissenting opinion focused on
how much weight should be given to
unprovoked flight in determining reason-
able suspicion.  After recognizing the fact
that sometimes those who flee may be
guilty of a crime, the dissent gave cre-
dence to the fact that there are those, par-
ticularly minorities, residing in high-
crime areas who flee because they believe
contact with the police itself can be dan-
gerous.81 The dissent argued that since
many factors provide innocent motiva-
tions for unprovoked flight in high-crime
areas, the character of the neighborhood
arguably makes an inference of guilt less
appropriate, rather than more so.82
WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF
WARDLOW AND WHAT WILL THE
FUTURE HOLD? 
Will Location-Plus-Evasion Stops
Actually Reduce Crime?
Wardlow has removed the aura of
unconstitutionality regarding location
plus evasion in Terry stops.  The majority
justified its holding in part by reiterating
the fact that the officers in Wardlow were
in an area of expected criminal activity,
but noted that this standing alone is not
enough to support a reasonable suspi-
cion.83 The majority then turned to its
belief that evasion is suggestive of wrong-
doing.84 The two factors combined
would determine reasonable suspicion
due to commonsense judgments and
inferences about human behavior.85
This reasoning supported the Court’s
view that police need a freer hand to
combat crime and to protect them-
selves,86 but the majority offered no sup-
porting evidence that allowing location
plus evasion as a lawful basis for Terry
stops would do this.  While people may
avoid the police for a variety of reasons,
62. See State v. Tucker, 642 A.2d 401 (N.J. 1994) (finding that flight
alone, without other articulable suspicion of criminal activity,
does not meet Terry standards); see also State v. Hicks, 488
N.W.2d 359 (Neb. 1992)(holding that flight is sufficient to justify
an investigatory stop only when coupled with specific knowledge
connecting the person to involvement in criminal conduct).
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64. Id.
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70. Id.
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(finding, contrary to the intermediate appellate court, that
Officer’s Nolan’s uncontradicted testimony was sufficient to estab-
lish that the incident occurred in a high-crime area).  
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86. See generally Williams, 407 U.S. at 148 n.3 (noting that officers
have reasons to fear for safety, citing studies that found 97% of
policemen murdered in 1972 were killed by gunshot wounds and
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reported cases focus only on those with
guilty motivations.87 Others who are
without guilt are nevertheless stopped
and frisked.88 They are not charged
because the search yields no evidence and
no reported case results.89
Will the Strained Relationship
Between Minorities and the
Police Become Further
Aggravated?
The majority did not consider that
most of these location-plus-evasion stops
will involve disproportionately higher
amounts of minorities and certainly will
only involve those among the low-
income class of society.  Consequently,
these are the same people who are more
likely to evade police for reasons other
than guilt.90
The dissenting opinion recognized
that there are entirely innocent persons
residing in high-crime areas who have
reasons to flee from police.91 Using com-
piled data from several sources, the dis-
sent pointed to several specific reasons
one may have for evading police:  police
brutality,92 harassment,93 and racial
bias.94 These factors were given little, if
any, weight by the majority before render-
ing its opinion.   
The majority saw the intrusion of a
Terry stop as minimal and believed that
the Fourth Amendment accepts the risk
that innocent people may be temporarily
detained.95 The Court did not consider
that these “minimal intrusions” are more
than just physical—they are emotional as
well. Since the stops must be conducted
in high-crime areas, the innocent resi-
dents of those locations who are stopped
could feel stigmatized as criminals by law
enforcement simply due to their eco-
nomic status and legitimate fear of
police.96 This could lead to the commu-
nities most in need of police protection
regarding the police as a racist, occupying
force.97
How Much Weight Will the Court
Give an Officer’s Testimony?
The dissent also discussed the vague
testimony provided by Officer Nolan.98
Officer Nolan could not recall whether he
was driving in a marked or unmarked car,
or whether any of the other cars in the
caravan were marked.99 The testimony
also did not reveal whether anyone
besides Wardlow was nearby when the
incident occurred, nor how fast the cara-
vans were driving.100 The dissent rea-
soned that the testimony of Officer
Nolan’s observation gave insufficient
weight to the reasonable-suspicion analy-
sis.101
The majority and the Illinois trial
court seemed to trust Officer Nolan’s abil-
ity to interpret the situation and did not
question the gaps left after his testimony.
This is in line with the Court’s decision in
Cortez to allow officers to interpret evi-
dence because of their experience and
training in law enforcement. If Nolan
believed Wardlow fled after noticing the
caravan of cars containing officers, then it
is assumed by the Court to be true.  This
clearly demonstrates the overwhelming
power that police officers now possess in
determining reasonable suspicion.  
CONCLUSION
By allowing location plus evasion to
provide reasonable suspicion, the
Supreme Court has given police more
power to fulfill their obligations to the
public and to protect themselves from the
possible risks associated with crime pre-
vention.  Officers have been given the
authority to deem locations “high-crime”
areas. While in those areas, police are
allowed to stop and frisk anyone who
happens to flee from them, regardless of
the reason.  These benefits come with the
high price of depriving residents in low
income areas from the same protection
against personal invasion than those liv-
ing in more affluent parts of America.
Although some of the persons temporar-
ily detained by officers will be guilty of
some crime, the majority will not, leaving
the taste of bitter resentment toward law
enforcement and a greater probability of
police evasion again in the future. 
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NEW BOOKS
ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL
JURY.  Carolina Academic Press, 2001
($40). 383 pp.
As we go about our daily tasks, all of
us tend simply to take care of what
needs to be done, without giving
much thought to “the big picture.”
Those folks who sell day planners and
Palm Pilots make money by telling us
that we need to focus on our most
important goals (the big picture) and
then to plan our lives with that big
picture in mind, using it to guide us
about what to leave in and what to
leave out.
Law professor Ellen Sward helps us to
locate the big-picture view of the civil
jury—and thereby to reorient our dis-
cussion of it.  Her main thesis is a sim-
ple one: that the civil jury performs
many functions that merit considera-
tion and protection.  She reviews in
detail the functions that civil juries
perform in our system; she then ana-
lyzes how legal changes, especially in
the past 50 years, have undermined
the ability of juries to perform those
functions.
Sward’s review of the functions played
by civil juries is scholarly, comprehen-
sive, and insightful.  She identifies
four overlapping functions or roles:
dispute resolution, law-making, a
political role, and a socializing role.
Her discussion of the jury’s political
and socializing roles is intriguing.
Sward argues that the jury is the only
widespread governmental institution
that provides both broad participation
by citizens and actual deliberation
between them.  What’s more, she
argues, it is the only governmental
institution that requires the participa-
tion of citizens in deliberation with
their fellow citizens.  
Whether viewed from the traditional
liberal perspective of freedom from
governmental interference or from a
civic republican perspective encourag-
ing public involvement in govern-
ment, she contends that this political
role of the jury is an important one.
For judges, it is important if only to
recognize that we are presiding over
one of the purest parts of the
American democracy every time we
convene a jury trial.  Sward contends,
however, that its importance is much
broader than that.  She also notes that
various judicial settlement efforts may
result in a substantial reduction in the
number of civil jury trials.  To the
extent that having such trials pro-
motes our democracy, she suggests
that we should factor that value into
our calculations when we decide how
to manage cases and dockets.
To be sure, Sward recognizes that
there are problems inherent in the
civil jury.  She discusses all of the
major criticisms of it (competence and
unbridled passion among them).  But
she concludes that there are important
roles for the civil jury to play, both for
the sake of our justice system and our
democracy, so that we should make
sure that enough cases continue to go
to the jury to make them meaningful,
without, as she puts it, “going to the
opposite extreme of coercing unwill-
ing litigants into trial.”  
Although the book is 383 pages long,
it is a quicker read than that because it
is written in law review style with
extensive footnotes often taking up
more than half of the page.  Unless
you’re planning on writing your own
treatise in the area, you can skip the
footnotes and concentrate on the sub-
stance of her presentation.  In so
doing, you’ll find some intriguing
insights about the use of civil juries in
the United States.
LAURA LANGER, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN STATE
SUPREME COURTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY.
State Univ. of New York Press, 2002
($20.95). 158 pp.
Judges like to speak of judicial inde-
pendence both as a goal and as a real-
ity.  Political scientist Laura Langer
tries in this book to determine how
independent state supreme courts
really are.
Her study focuses on decisions from
1970 through 1993 in which the con-
stitutionality of a state statute was
decided.  Cases reviewing four types of
statutes—campaign and election
reform, workers compensation, unem-
ployment compensation, and welfare
benefits—were included in the study.
Langer ran statistical comparisons
based on a variety of factors, such as
the manner of retention of appellate
judges in each state.
Langer attempts to determine whether
justices in contested cases voted sin-
cerely, i.e., based on their true prefer-
ences, or strategically, i.e., based on
possible retaliation by the governor,
legislature, or voters.  She concluded
that strategic voting was involved in
the high-profile world of campaign
finance, but less so with welfare legis-
lation.  She presumes that campaign
and election reform legislation is of
great salience to the elected officials in
the other branches, while welfare
reform is less so.  
Her book is not easy to read, as it con-
tains lots of statistics and social sci-
ence jargon, as well as some notions
that, at least to a judge, just seem a bit
foreign.  For example, she says, “Like
other politicians, judges are concerned
when their electoral or policy goals are
threatened.”  Not all judges are politi-
cians and most judges we know are
appropriately deferential to legislative
policy initiatives.  Still, the book raises
interesting questions and is a valuable
contribution to scholarship on state
supreme courts.
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